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ABSTRACT
Security mechanisms such as encryption, authentication, and feature activation depend on
the integrity of embedded secret keys. Currently, this keying material is stored as digital
bitstrings in non-volatile memory on FPGAs and ASICs. However, secrets stored this
way are not secure against a determined adversary, who can use specialized probing
attacks to uncover the secret. Furthermore, storing these pre-determined bitstrings suffers
from the disadvantage of not being able to generate the key only when needed. Physical
Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have emerged as a superior alternative to this.
A PUF is an embedded Integrated Circuit (IC) structure that is designed to
leverage random variations in physical parameters of on-chip components as the source of
entropy for generating random and unique bitstrings. PUFs also incorporate an on-chip
infrastructure for measuring and digitizing these variations in order to produce bitstrings.
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Additionally, PUFs are designed to reproduce a bitstring on-demand and therefore
eliminate the need for on-chip storage.
In this work, two novel PUFs are presented that leverage the random variations
observed in the resistance of transistors. A thorough analysis of the randomness,
uniqueness and stability characteristics of the bitstrings generated by these PUFs is
presented. All results shown are based on an exhaustive testing of a set of 63 chips
designed with numerous copies of the PUFs on each chip and fabricated in a 90 nm ninemetal layer technology. An on-chip voltage-to-digital conversion technique is also
presented and tested on the set of 63 chips. Statistical results of the bitstrings generated
by the on-chip digitization technique are compared with that of the voltage-derived
bitstrings to evaluate the efficacy of the digitization technique. One of the most important
quality metrics of the PUF and the on-chip voltage-to-digital converter, the stability, is
evaluated through a lengthy temperature-voltage testing over the range of -40oC to +85oC
and voltage variations of +/- 10% of the nominal supply voltage. The stability of both the
bitstrings and the underlying physical parameters is evaluated for the PUFs using the data
collected from the hardware experiments and supported with software simulations
conducted on the devices.
Several novel techniques are proposed and successfully tested that address known
issues related to instability of PUFs to changing temperature and voltage conditions, thus
rendering our PUFs more resilient to these changing conditions faced in practical use.
Lastly, an analysis of the stability to changing temperature and voltage variations
of a third PUF that leverages random variations in the resistance of the metal wires in the
power and ground grids of a chip is also presented.
vii
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 What is a Physical Unclonable Function?

A Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is an embedded IC structure designed to leverage
naturally occurring variations in the physical parameters of on-chip components such as
wires, transistors, etc. to produce a random bit string. These variations are unique to each
chip and cannot be reproduced or duplicated in its exactness hence, depending on the
parameter, can be leveraged to produce large numbers of random bits. Nothing in the
manufacturing process of a chip is exact, and therefore, all fabricated physical
components, e.g., wires and transistors, on the chip vary from their nominal
characteristics. Although it is possible to measure these physical variations directly, it is
extremely difficult or impossible to do so without sophisticated processes and equipment.
The analog electrical and parametric variations that result, on the other hand, can be
measured and processed more easily, and in many cases, this can be done using on-chip
instrumentation. Many proposed PUF-based systems are defined in this manner, and are
differentiated by the type of electrical variation they leverage. The magnitude and stability
of variations in, e.g., transient current, delay, leakage, resistance, capacitance, etc. are
dependent on the technology and the environment, and therefore, some PUF systems can
better meet certain quality metrics than others.
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PUFs are promising components for next generation of integrated circuit (IC)
security and continue to gain momentum as an alternative to the current practice of
embedding ‘secrets’ using fuses and non-volatile memory on ICs. PUFs can produce
repeatedly random bitstrings on the fly using dedicated hardware primitives and
processing engines, and therefore eliminate the need for a specialized non-volatile onchip memory to store them. This feature not only improves their resilience to invasive
attacks designed to steal the secret keying material, but it also reduces the cost of
manufacturing the IC. The latter is true because, in many cases, PUFs are designed using
components that can be fabricated using standard CMOS processing steps, and therefore,
the cost of integrating non-standard components, such as non-volatile memories, is
eliminated. PUFs generate random but reproducible bitstrings that can be used in security
applications such as encryption, authentication, feature activation, metering, etc.
A PUF produces a bitstring by applying a set of “challenges” to specialized circuit
primitives and measuring the corresponding “responses”. The challenges are typically
‘digital’ and therefore can be generated on-chip using a pseudo-random number generator
such as a linear feedback shift register (LFSR). The challenges are used to configure one
or more PUF circuit primitives prior to the application of a stimulus. The stimulus elicits
an analog response from the PUF primitives, which is measured and digitized by other
components of the PUF circuit. The digitized responses are then compared in a variety of
combinations to produce a digital bitstring.
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The PUF response is analog in nature, e.g., it can be a voltage drop or the
propagation delay of a signal through the PUF primitive. The analog nature of the
underlying random variable make the PUF sensitive to environmental variations such as
temperature and power supply noise. Several important applications of a PUF require that
they produce the same bitstring for a fixed challenge. Therefore, PUF architectures must
be both random and resilient to noise sources such as Temperature and Voltage (TV).
Another important characteristic of the PUF as a next generation security
mechanism is its potential for generating large numbers of repeatable random bits. This
feature offers new opportunities for software processes to strengthen security
mechanisms, for example, by allowing frequent re-keying in encrypted communication
channels and by allowing a large, changing set of shared keys to be utilized among
multiple communicating entities. PUFs are designed to be sensitive to variations in the
printed and implanted features of wires and transistors on the IC. Precise control over the
fabrication of IC components is becoming more difficult in advanced technology
generations, resulting in a wider range of electrical variations among and within the
replicated copies of the chip. Signal variations that occur within the IC are the source of
entropy for the PUF.

1.2 Quality Metrics of PUF Generated Bitstrings

The ‘quality’ of the bitstring produced can be measured against many statistical metrics,
but needs to meet three important criteria: 1) the bit string is unique for each chip, and
3
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thereby able to distinguish each chip in the population, 2) the bit string is random and
therefore difficult or impossible to model and predict by an adversary, and 3) the bit
string is stable, i.e., it remains constant for a given chip over time, and under varying
environmental conditions such as temperature and voltage. A PUF that is able to meet
these requirements can be used in applications related to security including chip
identification, authentication, as keys for encryption algorithms, for remote activation,
and for protecting Intellectual Property (IP).
Several statistical parameters have emerged as important metrics for judging the
quality of a PUF. Hamming Distance (HD) is defined as the number of bits that are
different when two bit strings are compared. Interchip HD is used to determine the
uniqueness of the bitstrings among the population of chips. An average inter-chip HD is
defined by computing the HDs across all combinations of bit strings from the chip
population. The best result occurs when exactly half of the bits from any two bit strings
are different, i.e., when the average HD, expressed as a percentage, is 50%. The intra-chip
HD can be used to evaluate stability of the bitstrings, i.e., the ability of each chip to
reproduce the same bitstring time-after time, under varying TV conditions. An intra-chip
HD is computed using all combinations of bit strings obtained from one chip in the
population under repeated sampling at different TV corners. An average intra-chip HD is
computed by averaging all of the individual intra-chip HDs. The ideal value in this case is
0%, i.e., each chip is able to reproduce the same bit string. Probability of failure, defined
as the ratio of the number of bits that are different to the total number of bits produced
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when comparing the bitstrings produced at different TV corners, is also used to evaluate
the stability of a bitstring.
Similarly, the NIST statistical test suite can be used to evaluate the randomness of
the bitstrings produced by each chip. These standardized battery of statistical tests
developed at NIST are applied at a significance level of 0.01 (the default) [1]. In general,
the NIST tests look for ‘patterns’ in the bit strings that are not likely to be found at all or
above a given frequency in a ‘truly random’ bit string. For example, long or short strings
of 0’s and 1’s, or specific patterns repeated in many places in the bit string work against
randomness. The output of the NIST statistical evaluation engine is the number of chips
that pass the null hypothesis for a given test. The null hypothesis is specified as the
condition in which the bitstring-under-test is random. Therefore, a good result is obtained
when the number of chips that pass the null hypothesis is large.

1.3 PUF Applications

As mentioned earlier, one of the main drawbacks of PUFs are their sensitivity to
environmental conditions. The temperature sensitivity and measures of uniqueness of
several popular PUF instantiations are captured in Table I [2]. As can be seen from Table
I, the intra-chip HD indicates that some PUF instantiations are very sensitive to
environmental conditions and as a result are very noisy. This noise can be random or
deterministic. Random errors are caused by circuit noise such as shot noise that are not as
predictable and are inherently present even in the absence of any environmental changes.
5
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The deterministic errors are more predictable and are caused by environmental condition
changes such as temperature variations, voltage variations, aging, etc. that induce local
mismatches of internal components of the device.

Table I. Typical temperature sensitivity and uniqueness of several popular PUF
instantiations [2][85]
PUF Type

Temperature

Intra-chip HD

Inter-chip HD

Range (ºC)

(%)

(%)

Ring-oscillator PUF 1

20 to 120

0.48

46.14%

Ring-oscillator PUF 2

25 to 65

1.9

-

Arbiter

20 to 120

9

38%

SRAM PUF

-20 to 80

<12

49.97%

Latch based PUF

0 to 80

5.5

50.55%

Butterfly PUF

-20 to 80

<6

50%

D-flip flop PUF

-40 to 80

10

-

Glitch-based PUF

0 to 80

8

-

For some applications like key generation or authentication, noisy PUF output is
unacceptable as the bitstring has to be reproducible with very little to no noise. Therefore,
techniques to correct for this noise or error have to be applied for such applications.
However, for applications such as identification, additional error correction techniques
can be avoided as long as the IDs are unique enough to tolerate the error associated with
6
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environmental variations. Therefore, even if relatively large errors occur, the chip can still
be identified correctly.

1.3.1 Identification and Authentication

Identification is the simplest application of a PUF that can be implemented without
additional error correction techniques. The process of identification is widely used in anticounterfeiting technologies. The process of identification consists of two phases:
enrollment and identification. During the enrollment phase, a PUF is challenged with
different challenge-sets and the challenge-response pairs (CRP) are stored in a database.
The identification phase allows identifying an entity that exhibits a challenge-response
pair contained in that database. The result of the whole identification process is a chip ID
which is assigned to the CRP in the database. The decision if the observed response
matches the entity in the database is usually made by HD calculations. In a PUF without
error correction techniques, the responses for the same set of challenges usually differ
slightly due to noise, and this is captured by the intra-chip HD.
The acceptable noise level for a positive identification depends on the intersection
of the intra-chip HD and the inter-chip HD distributions. An example of this is illustrated
in Fig. 1 [2]. For a particular type of PUF, the inter- and intra-distance characteristics are
often summarized by providing distributions showing the occurrence of both distances,
observed over a number of different challenges and a number of different chips. In many
cases, both distributions can be approximated by a gaussian distribution and are
7

Chapter 1. Introduction
summarized by providing their means and their standard deviations. The intra-chip HD
distribution represents the average reproducibility of a measured response with respect to
an earlier observation of the same response from a PUF while the interchip HD
distribution represents the distinguishability and the uniqueness of this response amongst
responses from other PUFs. A successful identification depends on the separation
between the intra-distance and inter-distance distributions. If both distributions do not
overlap, an errorless identification can be made. In the case of overlapping distributions,
errors in identification are possible. Either the wrong chip is erroneously identified which
is termed as False Acceptance Rate (FAR) or the correct chip is erroneously rejected
which is termed as False Rejection Rate (FRR). For cases of overlapping distributions, a
trade-off between FAR and FRR has to be made and the sum of these two errors has to be
minimized.

Fig. 1. Illustration of FRR and FAR [2]

PUFs can also be used to authenticate ICs with minimal hardware cost using a
challenge-response protocol. In this process, a secure database stores a set of CRPs from

8
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each PUF instance prior to the use of the IC. When the authenticity of the IC has to be
queried, a set of CRPs are chosen randomly from this database and applied to the PUF
circuit. The obtained response is compared with the responses stored in the database to
authenticate the IC. It is important that challenges are never reused to prevent man-in-the
middle attacks [3]. Hence it is extremely useful to have a PUF that can support large
number of CRPs. This feature has been demonstrated by implementing PUF based RFID
tags in 0.18um technology [8]. Results have shown that with a 128bit response, the FAR
and FRR can be reduced to a few parts per billion. This can be improved further by using
wider set of response bits. Hence PUFs are naturally suited for authentication and this has
been explored in several lightweight protocols [9][10]. Mutual authentication and
ownership transfer protocols to identify both RFID readers and tags by utilizing PUFs and
LFSRs have also been proposed [4]. Existing hash functions require 8000 to 10,000 gates
as compared to 784 gates used in this approach. It is also mentioned that an RFID tag can
afford a maximum of 2000 gates for security features. The use of PUFs has also been
proposed for IC activation and prevention of piracy in integrated circuits [10]. Roy et al.
have proposed the concept of Ending Piracy in Integrated Circuits (EPIC) which involves
embedding a combinational locking mechanism on the IC [11]. A random IC key pair is
generated during initial power-up and this is utilized to create a common key between the
user and the IP provider. The IP provider transmits this common key to the user to unlock
the IC. In resource constrained platforms, the use of PUFs has been proposed to generate
the unique signature necessary for this application.
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Bolotnyy et al. [12] have proposed the use of PUFs to implement privacy
preserving tag identification and secure message authentication code. When a reader
interrogates a tag, the tag responds with its ID and updates its identifier to the PUFs
response to the challenge ID. The backend database will need to store the challengeresponse pairs. In this way, a PUF based MAC protocol can use the PUFs response to
sign a message.

1.3.2 Key generation and Cryptography

Cryptographic primitives such as encryption and message authentication need the
presence of a secret key. The use of PUFs for secret key generation was first proposed in
[3]. A PUF can be used in secret key generation and the main requirement for such
applications is a stable and reproducible PUF output. In order to produce exactly the same
PUF response repeatedly over time, some error correction techniques have to be applied.
The process of secret key generation consists of two phases. The first is the generation
phase where the PUF is queried and the secret key is generated by an algorithm with the
aid of some helper data stored off-chip in a database. The second phase is the
regeneration phase where the PUF is queried again and the secret key is regenerated by
the algorithm with the helper data from the database. Thus, the algorithm extracts the
same secret key as in the generation phase. The helper data and algorithm are stored in an
off-chip database and generally reveal nothing about the secret key.
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Another application is the generation of secrets for cryptography. The advantage
of a PUF is that these secrets do not have to be stored anywhere on the hardware, since
they are generated dynamically at device reset. This is especially interesting for embedded
devices. An example of a cryptographic application involves a mobile phone whose
firmware must be decrypted on each startup. The cryptographic key must somehow be
stored securely. Solutions using nonvolatile memory or volatile memory with a battery
are vulnerable to physical attacks or side channel attacks. PUFs can reduce these
vulnerabilities, since physically disassembling such a circuit will destroy its delay
characteristics and therefore change its output.
As far as secure communication is concerned, there are several RFID (Radio
Frequency Identification) authentication schemes proposed that intend to strongly reduce
many of the vulnerabilities in today's RFID systems. These designs must be extremely
efficient both in energy and complexity since a typical RFID card may only offer a few
thousand logic gates. A proposed mutual-authentication scheme for RFID using PUFs
appears in [4]. The work in [5] uses a PUF's output to encrypt the challenge-response
pairs exchanged during RFID communication. In [6] SRAM PUFs are used to implement
a PKI system to encrypt the transmission of a bitstream to an FPGA. FPGA bitstream
encryption is also performed in [7] using an Anderson PUF.
Another example of the application of secret key generation by PUFs in
cryptography is the protection of device firmware. Transmission of the firmware to the
device utilizes a public/private key-pair. The server that maintains the firmware will
encrypt the firmware and then sign it using its own private key. This encrypted data is
11

Chapter 1. Introduction
then sent to the mobile device along with the server’s public key. In this case, the server
is not concerned with someone being able to capture this transmission and decrypt the
firmware, but is more concerned about proving to the devices that the packet is valid. To
support this approach, a mathematical operation known as a “hash” is performed on the
public key, which results in a non-reproducible, and often smaller value. This hash can be
stored in non-volatile storage on the mobile device and reveals nothing about the secret
key. When the device receives the firmware update package from the server, it performs
the same hash on the received server public key. If the result of the hash matches what is
in memory, the device knows that the key is valid and has not been altered. It can then use
the key to verify the signature of the firmware package and decrypt the remaining data.
Once the data has been decrypted, it can then be re-encrypted using the device-unique
PUF generated secret key and stored on the device.

1.3.3 Controlled PUFs and Secure Environments

The notion of controlled PUFs (CPUFs) was introduced by Gassend et al. [19].
Controlled PUFs are entities in which the PUF can be accessed only by an algorithm tied
to the physical device. The use of CPUFs to generate a secret to be shared between a
remote user and a physical device is mentioned in this work. In addition, introduction of a
user, renewal of CRPs, and anonymity preserving protocols have been discussed.
Applications such as certified execution and software licensing using CPUFs have also
been discussed. Certified execution involves producing a certificate verifying the
12
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authenticity of the IC. In distributed computing scenarios, this allows a remote user to
know that his program ran on a certified chip without being tampered. Similarly, use of
PUFs for software licensing will allow only authentic software to be run on a processor.
PUF circuits are an ideal choice for security applications and they form a part of
the security solutions offered in industry by Verayo and Intrinsic ID [13][14] amongst
others. Verayo offers the PUF as an IP to be licensed for RFID, ASIC and FPGA
applications. Intrinsic ID provides secure key storage to protect semiconductor products
from cloning and reverse engineering.
The idea of the PUF-based secure environment based on hardware generated keys
was introduced in [15]. In particular, the idea of this scenario is to generate a
cryptographic key which depends on the underlying hardware, and thus implicitly
identifies the device. Subsequently, the key is used to unlock encrypted software, which is
installed on the device. The idea is to decrypt the bootloader, which is executed first
during device start-up in the domain of embedded devices. After the bootloader has been
decrypted using the key derived from the PUF response, it subsequently unlocks the
kernel, which in turn decrypts user space applications. Since every layer relies on the
preceding layer to be decrypted, it is possible to establish a chain-of-trust with the
hardware constituting the anchor-of-trust. A full implementation of the scheme could
provide an alternative to current device identification approaches. The Mobile Trusted
Module (MTM) approach [16], for example, relies on storing several keys and certificates
in dedicated chips or in software. The former option requires additional hardware, which
induces extra costs from the manufacturer’s point of view. Alternatively, software MTMs
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cannot provide strong hardware-based anchors of trust. Traditional approaches are
potentially prone to side-channel attacks to extract cryptographic material. In contrast,
using intrinsic PUFs would bind a software instance to the hardware and not to a
permanently stored cryptographic key.

1.3.4 Random Number Generator

With some modification, a PUF design can also be turned into a true and
cryptographically secure random number generator. True random number generators have
been created by exploiting D-Flip Flop metastability [17], Ring Oscillators [18], and
SRAM PUFs [20]. In a similar way Deterministic Random Bit Generators (DRBG) can
be created, such as in [20]. DRBGs employ a deterministic algorithm to create pseudorandom numbers, but seed it with the random signature generated by a PUF. As long as
the seed remains secret, the numbers that are generated are not predictable. This system
can create large numbers of random numbers very quickly.
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1.4 Research Contributions

1.4.1 Proposed PUFs and On-Chip Voltage-to-Digital Converter

As part of this research, two novel PUF primitives that leverage resistance variations that
occur in transistors are presented. Specifically, the resistance variations in transistors that
make up the Transmission Gates (TGs) and Inverters in these two PUF primitives are
leveraged. Therefore, these two PUFs are named the Transmission Gate PUF (TG-PUF)
and the Inverter PUF (I-PUF) to refer to their respective primitives.
Hardware experiments are carried out on these PUFs built into a set of 63 chips
manufactured with a 90 nm nine-metal layer process. Each of these chips had numerous
copies of these PUF primitives designed in them, therefore allowing for a very
statistically significant sample size. Furthermore, all 63 of these chips were put through
rigorous and lengthy TV testing using a controlled temperature chamber allowing for data
collection across industrial rated TV ranges. Nine TV corners, using all combinations of
the temperatures -40ºC, 25ºC, and 85ºC and voltage variations of +/- 10% of the nominal
supply voltage, were tested. This work is unique in the fact that a full-blown 9 TV corner
testing was conducted on a sample size of this extent.
An embedded structure called a Voltage-to-Digital Converter (VDC) that was also
designed into each of the chips for the purposes of digitizing the analog output signals
from the PUF was also evaluated under these varying environmental conditions.
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The analysis of stability to TV variations of a PUF called the Power Grid PUF
(PG-PUF) [21][22] that is based on resistance variations which occur in the metal wires
of the chip’s power and ground grids is also presented. A significant benefit of using
metal structures is that “noise-related” variations, such as those introduced by TV
variations, result in linear changes to the measured voltages. This linear scaling
characteristic allows the relative magnitude of two voltages to remain fairly consistent
across changes in TV, which, in turn, improves the stability of the PUF to bit-flips, when
compared, for example to PUFs which leverage transistor-based variations. The analysis
presented is from experimental data collected on the same 63 chips fabricated with a 90
nm nine-metal layer process at 9 TV corners, i.e., over all combinations of 3 temperatures
-40ºC, 25ºC, and 85ºC and voltage variations of +/- 10% of the nominal supply voltage.
All analyses related to the PUFs stability to TV variations were scrutinized down
to the physical parameter level and not just the bit level. This work is unique and lacks
precedence in shedding light on evaluating the extent to which physical parameters affect
the stability characteristics of these novel PUFs. The hardware experimental data was also
verified with simulation, and the hardware and simulations results were compared and
contrasted.
The bitstrings generated from our PUFs are categorized into two types. First are
those generated directly by comparing the digitized voltages from the PUF with each
other and second are those that are generated by converting the digitized voltages into
thermometer codes with the aid of the on-chip VDC and then comparing those codes with
each other to generate the bitstring. The results presented include statistical analyses of
16

Chapter 1. Introduction
both the voltage-comparison generated bitstrings and the VDC-generated bitstrings. This
allows for evaluation of the pros and cons of each method of generating the bitstring and
more importantly, allows the evaluation of the penalties involved with the digitization
process. Other work in the PUF research domain usually evaluates only the digitized
bitstrings, so this research is unique in assessing both voltage-derived bitstrings and
digitized bitstrings.
A study of the area and power consumption characteristics of the novel PUFs was
also completed and the results compared against the characteristics of predominant
competing PUF designs.

1.4.2 Bit Flips and Novel Techniques to Avoid Them

In general terms, bit flips are defined as the specific bits that change or flip from “1” to
“0” or “0” to “1” when comparing two bitstrings generated at two different instances.
Since environmental conditions can be different at any two instances that the bitstring is
generated, the number of bit flips is an indication of the stability of the bitstring (and the
PUF used to generate it) to changing environmental conditions.
Needless to say, the fewer the bit flips the better. However, there will always be a
certain level of bit flips in any PUF and the key is to devise robust techniques to either
correct for these bit flips or avoid them.
Two noise-resilient bit-flip avoidance schemes that are designed to increase the
probability that the bitstring can be reproduced under varying environmental conditions
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are demonstrated. These novel techniques are developed as an alternative to popular error
correction [23] and helper data schemes [24] which tend to suffer from additional area
overhead/cost and the increased chance of attacks and data compromise.
The first technique derives a threshold from a chip’s digitized voltage drop
distribution profile that is used to decide whether a given comparison generates a strong
bit or a weak bit, where strong bits are defined as those that will not flip when the
bitstring is regenerated and weak bits as those that are more susceptible to flipping. A
second Triple Module Redundancy (TMR-based) scheme is proposed for fixed length
bitstrings that further improves bit-flip resilience. Although these techniques discard a
significant fraction of bits, they provide several significant advantages. The public
(helper) data associated with these methods reveals nothing about the secret bitstrings that
they encode. Second, for applications where the PUF responses are made public, the
difficulty of model building is significantly increased (assuming the public data is
obfuscated) because bitstrings are constructed using only a subset of all possible voltage
pairings. These techniques are tested and demonstrated with data obtained from the 63
chips fabricated in a 90 nm technology and provide a significant improvement to interchip Hamming Distance and the results obtained from NIST statistical tests [1].
Lastly, a compression technique was presented that would help reduce the size of
the public data associated with the thresholding and TMR techniques.
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Research on PUFs and process variation has been gaining increasing interest since the
concept of the PUF was formally introduced by Pappu, et. al. in [25] in 2001. In the
simplest sense, a PUF is a device whose transfer function exploits physical phenomena in
a way that cannot be replicated, even if the full design is known. The PUF designs that
have been proposed over the years have been diverse. The introduction of the PUF as a
mechanism to generate random bitstrings began in [25] and [19], although their use as
chip identifiers began a couple years earlier [26]. Since their introduction, there have been
many proposed architectures that are promising for PUF implementations, including those
that leverage variations in transistor threshold voltages [26], in speckle patterns [25], in
delay chains and ROs [19][25][27-31 + many others], in thin-film transistors [32], in
SRAMs [6][33], in leakage current [34], in metal resistance [21][35], in optics and phase
change [36], in sensors [37], in switching variations [38], in sub-threshold design [39], in
ROMs [40], in buskeepers [41], in microprocessors [42], using lithography effects [43],
and aging [44].
At the behavioral level, a PUF is often thought of as a hardware version of a
cryptographic hash function. It is sometimes also referred to as a physical one-way hash
function when implemented in a challenge-response framework. PUFs reduce the ability
of attackers to circumvent security mechanisms, as these mechanisms are implemented in
tamper-resistant hardware rather than at the software level. This property of tamper
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evidence has already been demonstrated for optical PUFs [25] and coating PUFs [45].
Furthermore, the devices are conceptually unclonable in the sense that, although they may
be physically copied, this provides no advantage to an attacker, because each copy will
behave differently. PUF designs exist that consume very little power, meaning a high
degree of security can be applied to embedded applications with extremely limited
resources, such as RFID cards.
The physical phenomena that underlie a PUF should be computationally difficult
to model. While sophisticated models for modeling transistor resistance in semiconductor
devices exist, much of the process variation inherent in any manufacturing process can
only be modeled as a statistical distribution. These variations exist within a die, between
dies, between wafers, and between lots or production batches. These variations appear in
the channel doping, channel width/length, and discrete transistor features, as well as the
thickness of oxide layers.
This variation exists for every property of a silicon device, any of which can have
an impact on the PUF's output. It is well-known that process variation is becoming harder
and harder to control as feature size shrinks. Moore’s law has driven CMOS scaling
technology over the years leading to increased complexities in designs. Deep sub-wavelength
lithography used in lower technology nodes brings greater challenges in the manufacturing
process. The amount of process variation seen follows an increasing trend with technology
and is becoming increasingly significant. As a result, designs aiming for high performance
will find it exceedingly difficult to meet the requirements in presence of these variations.
However, an increase in process variation benefits the identification capability that can be
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achieved by PUFs. PUF uniqueness is directly related to the amount of inter-chip variation
seen as this is what dictates the entropy in the system and with technology scaling, we expect
PUF uniqueness to increase. However, an increase in process variation will impact the
reliability across different environmental conditions [46] thus undesirably increasing the
intra-chip HD.

It has been shown that, at least between 90nm and 45nm processes, not only is
variation increasing but it is also becoming less systematic and more random, or
stochastic [47]. In [48] ring oscillators are used on a 90nm Field-Programmable Gate
Array (FPGA) to estimate the impact of process variation on delay variation. In the study,
the amount of variation is projected out to future process nodes. The delay through a
lookup table (LUT) was measured to have a mean variation (3σ) of +/-3.5%. The authors
projected that for 65nm this will increase to 4.5%, for 45nm 5.5% and 22nm 7.5%. The
estimation for 45nm aligns well with the empirical study performed in [47] in 2008,
suggesting the projection may be quite accurate.

2.1 PUF Classifications

PUFs can be classified into Strong and Weak PUFs based on the number of challenge
response pairs supported which subsequently determines the applications in which they
are used [49].
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2.1.1 Strong PUFs

Strong PUFs support a large number of CRPs and a complete measurement of all CRPs
within a feasible time frame is impossible. Further, it should be difficult for an attacker to
predict the response of the PUF for a random selected challenge, even with the prior
knowledge of a limited number of CRPs. This implies that the PUF should not be
susceptible to modeling attacks. Hence it is tough to mimic the behavior of a strong PUF
and this class of PUFs is ideally suited for IC identification and secret key generation.
Examples of strong silicon PUF constructions include Arbiter PUFs, feed forward arbiter
PUFs, XOR arbiter PUFs and lightweight secure PUFs.

2.1.2 Weak PUFs

Weak PUFs support a limited number of CRPs, sometimes just a single challenge. This
prevents their use in IC authentication applications as they will be susceptible to replay
attacks. Responses derived from weak PUFs are used to generate a secret key necessary
for embedded cryptosystems. Weak PUFs offer a better mechanism to generate secret
keys as opposed to storing them in non-volatile memory. The characteristics of a weak
PUF will be harder to read out using invasive techniques compared to digital storage in
memory. However the secret keys are still susceptible to side channel attacks just as in
any physical cryptosystem. Typical examples of weak PUFs are SRAM PUFs and
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butterfly PUFs. The concept of a Physically Obfuscated Key (POK) is similar to the idea
of a weak PUF where the responses are not given out and are used to generate a secret key
internally.

2.2 PUF Designs

A variety of PUF designs have appeared over the past decade. In fact, in [50] it is noted
that a new PUF design has appeared roughly each year since 2000.

2.2.1 SRAM PUF

An SRAM PUF is a kind of memory-based and bistable PUF and is depicted in Fig. 2
using the 6 Transistor (6T) SRAM cell. Memory-based PUFs exploit the unpredictability
of the startup value of volatile memory cells, which is caused by slight asymmetries in the
cell's internal routing and transistor characteristics. This PUF strongly relies on
randomness in transistor drive strength, i.e. the strongest inverter decides the startup
preference of the cell. The startup value is mainly determined by the relative strength of
the Threshold voltage (Vth).
SRAM PUFs are quite appealing due to the fact that they rely on commodity
SRAM cells. In fact, after the PUF signature is extracted, it is possible to use the same
cells as regular non-volatile memory. As an example, SRAM PUFs have even been
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evaluated on a commodity microcontroller [51]. In that work, a set of criteria and metrics
are proposed to determine whether a given SRAM can function as a PUF.
In their raw, uncorrected state, this type of PUF suffers from a relatively high error
rate and thus generally requires complex ECC circuitry and algorithms. Instability occurs
when the internal cell layout is too symmetrical; it becomes susceptible to environmental
noise, temperature changes, and power supply transients. One proposed approach to
combat unstable bits is to place more PUFs than needed, and add ADC circuitry to
automatically select the most stable ones [52]. Unfortunately, this approach is not
practical for FPGA-based studies since there is generally no flexible way to measure the
analog aspect of an internal signal. Another technique applies helper data algorithms to
normalize the output [6].
Lastly, SRAM cells are generally limited to 1 bit per cell which leads to a limited
CRP count compared to competing designs.

Fig. 2. 6T SRAM Cell PUF
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2.2.2 Butterfly PUF

Conceptually, the Butterfly PUF is somewhat similar to the SRAM PUF, in that they both
are memory and bistable cells whose startup value is hard to predict. However, it so
happens that FPGA SRAM cells are all reset to a known state upon device reset.
Therefore the Butterfly PUF was developed in [53] as a way to enable the study of
memory-type PUFs on an FPGA. It exploits the cross-coupled D Flip-Flop design, shown
in Fig. 3.
Initially the "excite" signal is raised high for a few clocks. Since the preset and
clear pins on the D Flip-Flops are asserted, and due to the cross-coupling of the outputs,
the circuit is held in an indeterminate, unstable state. When "excite" is released, the
circuit output will resolve itself to a stable state of either '1' or '0' based on the delay
mismatch between the interconnects. In the ideal case, in which the routes are totally
symmetrical, the outcome is determined by the effect the process variation has on the
delay.
The advantages of this design are that it uses only D- Flip Flops which are
ubiquitous in FPGAs as well as in general design processes.
The disadvantage of this design is that it requires extra care to route due to the
constraints of FPGA routing, and that the outputs of the latches can oscillate imposing
precise timing requirements on the excite signal for reproducible keys. Also, attaining a
metastable point prior to key generation is difficult due to the finite delays of latches and
interconnects.
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Fig. 3. Butterfly PUF

2.2.3 Ring Oscillator PUF

Generally PUFs based around design symmetry have been deemed less suited for
implementation on FPGAs due to the limitations of routing [54]. This is one of the
reasons for the popularity of RO-based designs on FPGAs, since absolute symmetry is not
necessary to create an oscillator, and the error associated with making a single
measurement is amortized across many oscillator cycles. The ring oscillator (RO) PUF,
depicted in Fig. 4, is one of the earliest and mature classes of delay-based silicon PUFs,
first introduced in [55][56]. A RO is simply a loop of inverters having an odd number of
stages. The circuit will spontaneously begin to oscillate with a frequency that can be
determined from the delay of each inverter stage.
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Fig. 4. RO PUF [3]

The RO PUF relies on the fact that any two rings will not oscillate at the exact same
frequency, even if they are laid out exactly the same. This is due to process variation
which impacts the delay of the signal propagating around the ring. The RO PUF shown in
Fig. 4 affixes a counter to each RO and compares the counts after a period of time, in
pair-wise fashion [3]. This "differential" measurement has been shown to give better
results than a basic RO design.
In [57] is performed the largest-scale analysis of RO behavior that is known to
date, using 90nm FPGAs as test platforms. The study confirmed that the RO PUFs
generated signatures were unique among different chips, and quite consistent within a
given chip.
It is clear from the workings of the RO PUF that it is very layout dependent and
there is a high area cost and higher power consumption of this design. Since the
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measurements are carried out over a relatively longer period of time, the RO PUF is fairly
susceptible to environmental variations.

2.2.4 Arbiter PUF

The arbiter PUF, depicted in Fig. 5, is another well-studied delay-based PUF design,
published in 2004 [58]. In the general sense, an arbiter PUF sets up a set of closelymatched race tracks with an arbiter at the end to determine which signal reached the end
first. Typically the arbiter is a D Flip-Flop with one signal attached to the clock pin and
another attached to the data pin.
Although shown as multiplexers, the adjustable delay portion of the circuit is
implemented in different ways. In [59], LUTs are used to create extremely precise
programmable delay lines.
A rigorous large-scale analysis of this kind of PUF is performed by [60]. In that
work, it is demonstrated that is quite feasible to make a fully-functional arbiter PUF on an
FPGA, despite the routing constraints. Interestingly, these results fall contrary to the
results of [54] which used timing tools to conclude that FPGA routes could not be
configured which are matched closely enough. This discrepancy demonstrates the
challenge of measuring process variation and the importance of empirical study.
While arbiter PUFs have been shown to be quite good in terms of adhering to
PUF properties, it has been shown that the basic form is vulnerable to model-building
attacks as delay is additive in nature [61]. Using machine learning, after observing a
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sufficient number of challenge-response pairs, it was possible to guess the outcome the
PUF with a 0.6% error rate.
Subsequent designs add additional complexity in order for the challenge to control
the delays in a non-linear way. An early attempt to introduce non-linearity is the feed
forward arbiter PUF [61]. Since then, there have been several rounds of attack proposals
followed by design modifications.
The arbiter PUF is also more layout dependent and susceptible to environmental
variations compared to other PUF designs.

Fig. 5. Arbiter PUF

2.2.5 Power Grid PUF

The Power Grid PUF (PG-PUF) was introduced in 2012 and leverages the variations in
resistance of the metal lines in the power and ground grids of a chip to implement a PUF
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[21]. The voltage drops across the individual metal layers are digitized and then
compared randomly with each other to generate the bitstring.
Since the resistance of metal wires varies linearly with temperature, the PG-PUF
can easily be designed to be resistant to aging effects such as electromigration. The
resistance can be measured using a simple DC process, which can improve the signal-tonoise ratio significantly over PUFs that leverage AC characteristics such as delay.
The PG-PUF is relatively easy to implement as the metal components are
ubiquitous on a chip, with the power grid consuming a large fraction of the metal
resources, e.g., 15-25% is typical in most commercial power grid designs.
The power grid is a stacked structure, offering a 3rd dimension in which to
leverage entropy in a PG-PUF. Also, the interconnected structure of the wires in the
power grid complicates the interaction among variations in resistance that occur, thereby
increasing the complexity of model building attacks.
A more completion description of the PG-PUF operation is provided in later
sections of this document.

2.2.6 Hardware-Embedded Delay PUF

The Hardware-Embedded Delay PUF (HELP), depicted in Fig. 6, is a delay-based PUF
introduced in 2013 [62] and is designed to leverage the natural variations that occur in the
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Fig. 6. Top-Level HELP system diagram [62]

path delays of a core macro on a chip to create a unique, stable, and random bitstring of
virtually any length.
HELP has demonstrated the capability of comparing paths of widely differing
lengths and eliminating the need for specially designed, layout-dependent delay elements
that impose a high area cost while providing a relatively small amount of entropy. The
design is supposed to be minimally invasive with low area and performance impact.
HELP also exhibits a large number of paths typically found in logic macros such
as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). This large source of entropy allows HELP
to generate large bitstrings, despite being extremely conservative in the paths selected for
bit generation.
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The challenge component for HELP consists of a randomly selected, two-vector
test sequence applied to the inputs of the macro-under-test (MUT), which introduces a set
of transitions that propagate through the core logic of the MUT and emerge on its outputs.
The responses are the measured path delays on each of the outputs, and are expressed as
8-bit numbers that correspond to path delay. A single MUT output is isolated and
measured individually. A bitstring is generated by comparing pairs of these path delays.

2.3. Attacks

While PUFs are reliable and secure because of their intrinsic unique properties obtained
due to manufacturing process variations, there are vulnerabilities to some attacks.
A key characteristic of PUFs is the entropy of its responses. The entropy
quantifies the number of independent and random IDs that can be generated by the same
device architecture. This is proportional to the amount of variation in the physical
parameter being leveraged to generate the ID.
Successful product counterfeiting involves the production of a clone. By
definition, the cloned device needs to have a PUF with the exact same intrinsic properties
as the original one. The probability of success in cloning a PUF depends on the PUF's
entropy, thus it is very important to design a PUF with large entropy. The larger the
entropy of the original PUF, the more instances are needed in order to successfully create
an identical cloned PUF. If the entropy of the PUF is b bits, then it is theoretically
possible to obtain 2b number of unique identifiers from it. Assuming all these identifiers
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are uniformly distributed, the probability of occurrence of each ID is equal. But because
of the birthday paradox, the population of all possible identifiers is 2b/2. Due to the large
number of instances needed for a successful cloning, such clone attacks makes sense only
if the resulting profits are greater than the incurred expenses.

2.3.1 Modeling attacks

Modeling attacks are well described in [63] by Ruhrmair et al. They are based on machine
learning algorithms when some CRPs are known and are outlined for Arbiter and RingOscillator PUFs [3]. In these attacks, the adversary collects many CRPs and uses them to
derive the runtime delays occurring in the subcomponents of the electrical circuit. Once
they are known, simple simulation and prediction of the PUF becomes possible, breaking
its security.
High modeling accuracies can be obtained through machine learning techniques
like support vector machines and artificial neural networks [3]. Given a limited set of
training CRPs, algorithms automatically learn the input-output behavior by trying to
generalize the underlying interactions. The more linear a system, the easier to learn its
behavior.
In the paper proposing arbiter PUFs as a security primitive, machine learning was
already identified as a threat [64]. The authors reported a modeling accuracy of 97% for
their 64-stage 0.18µm CMOS implementation.
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2.3.2 Side-channel attacks

The result of reverse engineering the internal structure of a PUF by an attacker is the
alteration of the CRP characteristics of the PUF. However, the attacker is able to measure
external characteristics of the PUF circuit such as electromagnetic radiation, time various
computations, power consumption, etc. Attacks formulated based on observation of
external characteristics of the circuit are termed side-channel attacks. Previously
published work outlines the susceptibility of the PUFs to side-channel attacks [65][66].
For example, the PUF output can be learnt and predicted by investigating the power
leakage occurring in the error correction phase [65]. However, side channel attacks are
harder to implement due to the resources required for external observation and
correlation.

2.3.3 Invasive attacks

Invasive attacks involve the depackaging of the chip in order to get direct access to its
inner components and enable the reading out of the states of register, latches, etc. There is
a high probability that the removal of the chip layers causes the destroying of the unique
chip fingerprint [67] therefore invasive techniques are seldom successful. Furthermore,
invasive attacks generally require capital intensive failure analysis equipment. However,
[68] proposes successful semi-invasive attacks based on EM signals.
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Circuits containing secure data are vulnerable to invasive attacks if they use
sequential logic or store secret unencrypted data in SRAM. It has been proposed that to
prevent invasive attacks, the PUF response must be processed and stored in a serial
manner, i.e. the whole circuit must be serialized [69]. Serialized PUFs cannot generate
more than one response at a given point in time limiting the response exposure to external
characterization. Thus, only a subset of the full hardware PUF response is ever vulnerable
in this implementation. An arbiter PUF is a good example of a serialized PUF while the
RO PUF is not serialized since the individual oscillators run simultaneously meaning that
more than a single PUF response is present on the device at any given point in time.
Making SRAM PUFs more resilient to invasive attacks is also possible by implementing
an asynchronous reset for the SRAM [69].
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3.1 Test Chip Architecture

Fig. 7 illustrates the block diagram of the 90 nm test chip architecture used for all the
experimental data collection in this research. The chip pad-frame consists of 56 I/Os, and
surrounds a chip area of approx. 1.5 mm x 1.5 mm. Four pads labeled PS1, PS2, NS1 and
NS2 refer to voltage sense connections; the ‘P’ version for sensing voltages near VDD and
the ‘N’ version for voltages near GND. These four terminals wire onto the chip and
connect to 85 copies of a Stimulus/Measure circuit (SMC). The SMCs are distributed
across the entire chip (see small rectangles) as two arrays, a 7x7 outer array and a 6x6
inner array. Although not shown, a controlling scan chain connects serially to each of the
SMCs.
The distance between the SMCs is 250µm and noteworthy from Fig. 7 is the fact
that the length of the sense wires from the SMC to the voltage sense pads differ from
SMC to SMC.
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Fig. 7. Block diagram of 90nm test chip

3.2 Transmission Gate PUF (TG-PUF)

The TG-PUF was introduced in 2012 [21] and analyzed in detail in [70]. It leverages the
resistance variations in transistors, specifically of those that make up the transmission
gates of the TG-PUF primitive.
The schematic diagram of the SMC is shown in Fig. 8. A set of 20 ‘pseudo’ pass
gates (hereafter referred to as transmissions gates or TGs) serve as both the PUF
primitives and voltage sensing elements. Eight of the TGs, labeled 1 through 8, connect
to the first 8 (of the 9) metal layers that define the VDD grid, as shown on the left side of
Fig. 8, while the other eight connect to the GND grid. Two additional TGs, labeled as 9
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and 10, connect to the drains of the 1-8 TGs. Separate scan FFs control their connection
to the chip-wide wires that route to the P/NSx pins shown in Fig. 8.
For the TG-PUF, the SMC is configured so that the PS1 and NS1 sense wires are
connected off-chip to GND and VDD, respectively, to create the stimulus condition
described as follows. PS2 and NS2 are routed to off-chip Agilent 34401A voltmeters
(VMs). The pair of shorting transistors in Fig. 8 is always off during the TG-PUF
experiments so as to allow the current path to consist of the TGs and not the shorting
transistors.

Fig. 8. Stimulus Measure Circuit (SMC) schematic

Voltage drop measurements are carried out by enabling three TGs, both of those
labeled 9 and 10 and one from the group 1 through 8. For example, using the PFET TGs,
enabling TG 1 and 9 creates a short between the VDD grid on-chip and a GND node off-
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chip. The voltage falls across the two TGs as well as the PS1 wire. The voltage on the
intermediate node w between TG1 and 9 can be sensed with TG10. Only a negligible
amount of current flows through TG10 to the voltmeter, so the voltage on node w or y is
nearly identical to that at the voltmeter. The on-resistances of the TGs (and the resistance
of the PS1 wire) determine how much of the VDD voltage falls across each of TG1 and 9.
Random variations in the on-resistances of TG1 through 8 (referred to subsequently as the
stacked NFETs or PFETs) produce different voltage drops as each is enabled. We refer to
the voltages at the intermediate node (w for PFETs or y for NFETs) as Transmission Gate
Voltages (TGVs). Therefore, it is the TGV that represents a single unit of entropy in the
TG-PUF and the basic primitives are shown in Fig. 9. It should be noted that the body of
both NFETs are connected to GND while those of both PFETs are connected to VDD.

(a)

(b)
Fig. 9. TG-PUF primitives for (a) PFET (b) NFET
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Referring to Fig. 9, it is clear that the TG-PUF primitive works as a voltage
divider circuit, the intermediate voltages of which are a function of the Ron of the
transistors. Considering the NFET primitive as an example, (1) illustrates the dependence
of the TGV voltage Vy on the individual transistor Ron.

1
 R1 
Vy  VDD 
 VDD

R9
 R1  R9 
1
R1

(1)

where R1 is the Ron of TG1 (Stack NFET TG) and R9 is the Ron of NFET TG9.
The component of the TGV that falls across the sense wires represents a bias
because, as mentioned previously, the length of the sense wires is different for each SMC
in the array. This bias is illustrated in Fig. A1 in Appendix A using experimental data
collected from one of our chips. The bias is eliminated by creating TGV differences
(TGVDs) using the 8 TGVs measured within each SMC, separately for NFETs and
PFETs. Refer to Fig. A2 in Appendix A for an illustration of the bias removal using
experimental data collected from one of our chips. The TGVDs are obtained by
subtracting pairs of TGV values. With 8 TGVs, a total of 8*7/2 = 28 TGVDs can be
created in each stack. The total number of TGVDs obtained per chip is 2,380 for each of
the PFETs and NFETs, obtained as 85 SMCs * 28 TGVDs/SMC. The NFET and PFET
TGVDs, in turn, can be compared under all combinations to produce bitstrings of length
2,380*2,379/2 * 2 = 5,662,020 bits. It should be noted that the NFET and PFET TGVDs
cannot be compared with each other primarily because of channel width differences
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(PFETs are 2.5x wider than the NFETs) and as shown in Fig. 10, mobility variations with
doping (NFET variations are larger than PFET variations). As a consequence, PFET
voltage variations are only about half as large as the NFET variations (see Figs. A4 and
A6 in Appendix A). In our experiments, the order in which the comparisons are made is
randomized using srand(seed) and rand() from the C programming library. This operation
is easily implemented on chip using an LFSR and a seed.
This “differences” comparison strategy to eliminate sense wire bias was devised
after some preliminary experimentation with an “absolute” comparison strategy where no
difference operation was done. The results of those experiments are presented in a later
section.

n
p

Fig. 10. Mobility as a function of doping concentration in Si [71]
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3.3 Power Grid PUF (PG-PUF)

The PG-PUF was introduced in 2012 [21] and analyzed in detail in [22]. It leverages the
resistance variations in the metal layers, specifically that of those that make up the power
and ground grids of the chip. For the PG-PUF experiments, the SMC of Fig. 8 is
configured so that the pair of shorting transistors is always on and sinks approx. 10 mA of
current through the power grid. This results in a voltage drop/rise on the VDD and GND
grid, respectively of less than 10 mV. The set of 16 ‘pseudo’ transmission gates (TGs) in
the stack, labeled 1 through 8, serve as voltage sense devices for the PG-PUF. Eight of
these TGs connect to the first 8 (of the 9) metal layers that define the VDD stack-up of the
power grid, as shown on the left side of Fig. 8, while the other 8 connect to the GND
stack-up. Scan FFs and 3-to-8 decoders allow exactly one of the TGs to be enabled in
each of the stack-ups.
For the PG-PUF experiments, TG9 (one for VDD and one for GND) is enabled
while TG10 is disabled. Separate scan FFs control the TG9 connection to the chip-wide
wires that route to the PS1 and NS1 pins of Fig. 7, which are in turn routed to off-chip
VMs. This configuration and control mechanism allows any VDD and GND voltage to be
measured using off-chip VMs.
A ‘challenge’ is applied by configuring the scan chain to 1) enable the shorting
transistors within an SMC, and 2) enable two TGs in that same SMC, in particular, the
TG labeled 9 in Fig. 8 and one from the group 1 through 8. Once enabled, the voltage
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drop/rise, denoted as Power Grid Voltages (PGVs), is measured on the NS1 and PS1 pads
using VMs.
In order to reduce bias effects and correlations that exist in the VDD and GND
stack-ups for the PG-PUF, inter-layer voltage drops/rises are computed by subtracting
pair-wise, the voltages measured from consecutive metal layers, i.e., VM1 - VM2, VM2 VM3, etc [21]. These voltage differences, called Power Grid Voltage Differences
(PGVDs), also allow the PUF to leverage the independent resistance variations that occur
in each of the metal layers of the power grid. The 8 TGs in the VDD and GND stacks as
shown in Fig. 8 indicate that 7 PGVDs can be computed per stack. However, the structure
of the power grid on the chips reduces the voltage drops on the upper layers of the power
grid. Therefore, the analysis is restricted to PGVDs generated using the lower 4 metal
layers, which allows 3 PGVDs to be computed. Therefore, each chip generates 85 SMCs
* 3 metal layer pairings = 255 PGVDs for each of the VDD and GND stacks. Each of the
PGVDs can be compared with other PGVDs in various combinations to produce a
bitstring. Bitstrings are generated by comparing each PGVD with all others generated
using the same metal layer pairing. Therefore, the total number of bits per chip is 85*84/2
per metal layer pairing * 3 metal layer pairings * 2 grids = 3,570* 6 = 21,420 bits.
Each of the 340 stacked NFET TGs (since we restrict our analysis to the lower 4
metal layers as described previously) is enabled, one at a time, and the corresponding
PGV is measured using a VM connected to NS1. The current through the shorting
transistors path is also measured so as to allow Power Grid Equivalent Resistance
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(PGER) calculations. This process is repeated for the stacked PFET TGs. The mean
values of 11 samples are used to compute inter-layer voltage drops/rises (PGVDs).
In the experiments, the order in which the comparisons are made is randomized
using srand(seed) and rand() from the C programming library. This operation is easily
implemented on chip using an LFSR and a seed.
For the purposes of this thesis, only an analysis of the stability of the PG-PUF to
changing TV conditions is presented. A more thorough analyses of other characteristics
of this PUF and the generated bitstrings is covered in [21] and [22].

3.4 Inverter PUF (I-PUF)

The Inverter PUF was introduced in 2013 [72] and leverages the resistance variations in
transistors, specifically of those that are configured in the SMC as inverter-like structures,
although they do not operate as inverters in the traditional sense.
The schematic diagram and configuration of the SMC setup that enables the IPUF is shown in Fig. 11.
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NS2

Fig. 11. I-PUF SMC setup schematic

A set of 20 MOSFETs (10 NFETs and 10 PFETs) serve as both the PUF
primitives and voltage sensing elements for the I-PUF. The eight stacked PFETs (1p-8p)
connect to the first 8 (of the 9) metal layers that define the VDD grid, as shown on the left
side of Fig. 11, while the eight stacked NFETs (1n-8n) connect to the GND grid. Two
additional PFETs (and NFETs), labeled as 9p and 10p, connect to the drains of the
stacked transistors. Separate scan FFs control their connection to the chip-wide wires that
route to the P/NSx pins shown in Fig. 11. The PS1 and NS1 sense wires are tied together
and connect to an off-chip Agilent 34401A voltmeter that measures the voltage on the
NS1/PS1 sense wire. The PS2 and NS2 sense wires are also tied together in a similar
fashion and connect to a VM that measures the voltage on the NS2/PS2 wire. The pair of
shorting transistors in Fig. 11 is always off during the Inverter PUF experiments so as to
eliminate these shorting transistors from the current path.

45

Chapter 3. Design and Experiment Setup
Voltage drop measurements are carried out by enabling four transistors at a time.
Referring to Fig. 11, these four transistors are NFET9n and PFET9p, and any one stacked
PFET and any one stacked NFET. This setup creates a short between the VDD and GND
grids and the voltage falls across the four MOSFETs and the sense wire. The voltage on
the intermediate node w between the stacked PFET and PFET9p can be sensed by
enabling PFET10p. This would appear as a voltage measurement on the VM connected to
the NS2/PS2 sense wire. The voltage on the node between PFET9p and NFET9n is
measured by the VM connected to the NS1/PS1 sense wire, while the intermediate voltage
y between NFET9n and the stacked NFET is measured by enabling NFET10n and
registering the measurement on the VM connected to the NS2/PS2 sense wire. Therefore,
we are able to create 8 paths/SMC X 85 SMCs/chip = 680 different paths per chip. Now,
following the aforementioned setup, as we enable different stacked NFETs 1n-8n and
stacked PFETs 1p-8p one at a time, we are able to get random and unique voltage
measurements at each of the three intermediate nodes. The on-resistances of the
MOSFETs (and the resistance of the sense wire) determine how much of the VDD voltage
falls across each of the MOSFETs. Random variations in the on-resistances of the stacked
PFETs and NFETs produce different voltage drops as each is enabled. It should also be
noted that the body of both NFETs are connected to GND while those of both PFETs are
connected to VDD. We refer to the voltage at the intermediate node between PFET9p and
NFET9n as the inverter Output Voltage (VO). Therefore, it is the VO that represents a
single unit of entropy in the I-PUF and the basic primitive is shown in Fig. 12.
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Fig. 12. I-PUF primitive

The I-PUF primitive also works as a voltage divider circuit, the intermediate
voltages of which are a function of the Ron of the transistors. Equation (2) illustrates the
dependence of the voltage VO on the individual transistor Ron.

1
 RN 1 
VO  VDD 

V
DD

RP1
 RN 1  RP1 
1
RN 1
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where RN1 is the sum of the Ron of NFET1n (stacked NFET) and NFET9n and RP1 is the
sum of the Ron of PFET1p (stacked PFET) and PFET9p.
The component of VO that falls across the sense wires represents a bias because
the length of the sense wires is different for each SMC in the array. This bias is illustrated
in Fig. A3 in Appendix A using experimental data collected from one of our chips. The
bias is eliminated by creating output voltage differences (VODs) using the 8 VOs
measured within each SMC. The VODs are obtained by subtracting pairs of VO values.
With 8 VOs, a total of 8*7/2 = 28 VODs can be created for each SMC. The total number
of VODs obtained per chip is 2,380, obtained as 85 SMCs * 28 VODs/SMC. These
VODs, in turn, can be compared under all combinations to produce bitstrings of length
2,380*2,379/2 = 2,831,010 bits.
This “differences” comparison strategy to eliminate sense wire bias was devised
after some preliminary experimentation with an “absolute” comparison strategy on the
TG-PUF where no difference operation was done. The results of those experiments are
presented in a later section.
The VO voltages exhibit much larger variation than the TGV voltages in the TGPUF as illustrated in Fig. A8 of Appendix A. The reason for this is that the variation in
the on-resistances of the two PFETs and the two NFETs are combined in the I-PUF
primitive, whereas in the TG-PUF, the primitives contained either two NFETs or two
PFETs but not both. This combined PFET path and the combined NFET path, which are
responsible for determining the mid-point VO voltage, are much larger than the onresistances of just the NFETs (used to determine the mid-point TGV voltage of the NFET
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TG-PUF) or the PFETs (used to determine the mid-point TGV voltage of the PFET TGPUF). Similar to how greater voltage variation is seen on the higher resistance lower
metal layers of a chip versus the lower resistance upper metal layers, the variation in the
higher on-resistance of the combined PFET and combined NFET paths of the I-PUF
primitive result in a much larger voltage variation as compared to the TG-PUF.

3.5 On-chip Voltage-to-Digital Converter (VDC)

3.5.1 VDC Functionality

For the TG-PUF and I-PUF, in addition to analyzing the TV stability characteristics of the
voltage drops and on-resistances, we also briefly analyze the TV stability of a digital
representation of them that is produced by an on-chip VDC, similar to designs described
in [73]. The architecture of the VDC is shown in Fig. 13. The VDC is designed to ‘pulse
shrink’ a negative input pulse as it propagates down a current-starved inverter chain. As
the pulse moves down the inverter chain, it activates a corresponding set of latches to
record the passage of the pulse, where activation is defined as storing a ‘1’. A
Thermometer Code (TC), i.e., a sequence of ‘1’s followed by a sequence of ‘0’s,
represents the digitized voltage.
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Fig. 13. On-chip Voltage-to-Digital-Converter architecture

The voltage-to-digital conversion is accomplished by introducing a fixed-width (constant)
input pulse, which is generated by the pulse generator shown on the left side of Fig. 13.
Two analog voltages, labeled Cal0 and Cal1 connect to a set of NFET transistors in the
inverter chain, with Cal0 connecting to the NFETs in odd numbered inverters and Cal1
connecting to the NFETs in even numbered inverters. The propagation speed of the two
edges associated with the pulse is controlled separately by these voltages. The Cal0
voltage controls the propagation speed of the back-edge while the Cal1 voltage controls
the speed of the front-edge. The back-edge of the pulse catches up to the front-edge
eventually and in order to ensure that the pulse shrinks as it propagates down the inverter
chain, the Cal0 voltage needs to be larger than the Cal1 voltage. This behavior is
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illustrated with the aid of Fig. 14 which depicts a delay element from the on-chip VDC
and the associated rise and fall times of the pulse. Assuming the width of the input pulse
in1 is T and the width of the output pulse out2 (after passing through 1 delay element) is
T’, then

T’ = T + td1f + td2r – td1r – td2f = T + [(td1f – td1r) + (td2r – td2f)]

(3)

where td1f and td1r are the fall time and rise time, respectively, of the out1 pulse while td2f
and td2r are the fall time and rise time, respectively, of the out2 pulse. Therefore, if we
define T’ as T – TLSB, then it can be deduced that the original pulse width T is reduced by
one TLSB, which is the resolution of the VDC defined by:

TLSB = (td1r – td1f) – (td2r – td2f)

(4)

Also, noteworthy from Fig. 14 is that td1f is inversely proportional to the Cal0 voltage
while td2f is inversely proportional to the Cal1 voltage. The pulse will eventually die out
at some point along the inverter chain when the back edge of the pulse ‘catches up’ to the
front edge. A digital representation of the voltages can then be obtained by counting the
number of ‘1’s in the latches.
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Fig. 14. Delay element of VDC

It was determined through preliminary experimentation that in order to enable the
desirable type of pulse shrinking behavior, the Cal1 voltage needs to be set to a value
between 500 mV and 800 mV. It was determined that if the Cal1 voltage is less than
500mV, the pulse dies too quickly to maintain a good sensitivity and register an accurate
measurement, while if the Cal1 voltage is greater than 800mV, the pulse doesn’t die and
causes overflow. This is because of the relative pull-down strengths of the current-starved
inverters and how that pertains to the rise and fall times of (3).

3.5.2 VDC Data Collection Process

For the TG-PUF, each of the 680 stacked NFET TGs is enabled, one at a time, and the
corresponding TGV is measured using a VM connected to NS2. The current through the
path is also measured so as to allow on-resistance calculations of the individual TGs. The
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Cal1 power supply is programmed with this TGV plus an offset and calibration factor
(the details of which are described in a later section) and 11 TC samples are collected
from the VDC. This process is repeated for the 680 stacked PFET TGs. The mean value
of the 11 samples is used to compute a ‘difference’ value, synonymous to the TGVDs
described previously. We use the term TCD to refer to these Thermometer Code
Differences in the remainder of this thesis. The Cal0 power supply is programmed with
the core chip power supply voltage value (VDD) in order to produce a negative shrinking
pulse.
For the I-PUF, each of the 680 four-transistor paths are enabled one at a time and
the intermediate output voltages (VO and those at w and y) are measured using a VM
connected to the corresponding sense wire. The current through the path is also measured
so as to allow on-resistance (Ron) calculations of the individual MOSFETs. 11 voltage
and current samples are collected to ensure statistically valid data. The Cal1 power supply
is programmed with these VO values plus a calibration factor (the details of which are
described in a later section) and 11 TC samples are collected from the VDC. The mean
value of the 11 samples is used to compute a TCD value, synonymous to the VODs
described previously. The Cal0 power supply is programmed with the core chip power
supply voltage value (VDD) in order to produce a negative shrinking pulse.
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3.5.3 Need for Voltage Offsets and Calibration Factors

As stated previously, for the TG-PUF and the I-PUF, the Cal1 power supply is
programmed with the measured PUF primitive voltage plus an offset and/or a calibration
factor. This is required for two different reasons as explained below.
For the TG-PUF, the voltage-divider (series) arrangement of the identicallysized TGs shown in Fig. 9 should provide voltages at the midpoint of the supply voltage,
e.g., approx. 600 mV for a 1.2V VDD. This is not the case, however, for two reasons; 1) a
portion of the voltage falls across the NS1 (for NFETs) and PS1 (for PFETs) sense wires,
and 2) the series-connected transistors in the shorting path operate in different regions of
operation, e.g., for both NFETs and PFETs, TG9 and TG1 in Fig. 9 operate in saturation
mode and linear modes, respectively. As a consequence, the range of the TGVs observed
in our experiments at node w in Fig. 9 for PFETs is between 950 mV to 1050 mV, and at
node y for NFETs is 150 mV to 250 mV. As stated earlier, the desirable range for the
Cal1 voltage is between 500mV to 800mV, therefore in order to move Cal1 into that
range, an offset voltage is added (subtracted) to the TGV voltages measured by the VM as
shown in Fig. 10 for NFETs (PFETs). This offset voltage is computed as part of a
calibration process briefly described below and expanded upon in the next section.
The calibration process is needed because the required offset voltage changes as a
function of changing TV conditions. From our experiments, the results of which are
presented in a later section, we found that the VDC curves shift with changing TV
conditions. To be precise, when the TC versus Cal1 voltage characteristics of the VDC
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are plotted for all 9 TV corners, it is seen that the curves shift along the x-axis. Although
the VDC remains stable across the TV corners, this shift along the x-axis causes overflow
in the VDC; a situation where the pulse propagates through all 120 delay chain elements
and therefore, no meaningful data is discerned. A calibration process is carried out that
tunes the ‘offset’ at each TV corner, and effectively eliminates the adverse effects of the
curve shift. Basically, the calibration process tests a distributed set of 9 TGs, e.g., of the
680 NFET TGs, and uses binary search to find an offset voltage that produces a ‘target’
TC, separately for each of the 9 tests. This is done for each of the 9 TV corners. We set
the target TCs for NFET and PFET TGVs to 65 and 85, respectively. These targets
worked well to prevent overflow in all of the 1,360 TG measurements, across all TVs and
chips used in our experiments. The median offset from the 9 calibration tests (for each of
the 9 TV corners) is then added to all the TGV voltages measured during the subsequent
data collection process. This calibration procedure only approximates the best offset, but
does not need to be precise because the goal is only to prevent overflow in the VDC. A
more detailed explanation of the process is given next.
It should be noted that unlike the TG-PUF, the I-PUF does not require a voltage
offset to be added to the VO voltages to bring it into the optimal 500 mV – 800 mV range
for Cal1. This is because the inverter-like design of the I-PUF primitive ensures that the
VO voltage is close to half of the power supply voltage or around 600 mV. However, the
calibration process is still needed for the I-PUF due to the shifts seen in the VDC curves
with changing TV conditions.
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3.5.4 VDC Calibration Process

The calibration process briefly described in the previous section is further illustrated
using the Cal1 vs. TC curves for the TG-PUF shown in Fig. 15. As indicated earlier,
calibration is carried out before enrollment and regeneration only once during PUF
characterization, and its objective is to find an appropriate Cal1 voltage offset that
prevents overflow in the VDC for any of the TGVs that will be measured during bit
generation at any TV.

(a)

(b)

Fig. 15. (a) VDC calibration curves at 85, 25, and -40ºC and 1.2V illustrating the offset
calculation process (b) Illustration of the binary search process used during calibration at
85ºC, 1.2V
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We determined that testing a subset of 9 TGs during calibration is sufficient to obtain a
good predictor for offset voltage that prevents overflow. The goal of calibration is to
select an offset voltage such that the TG-under-test produces the same TC value
independent of the TV corner. This objective is illustrated in Fig. 15(a) with the
horizontal dashed line at TC = 65. The 3 curves shown represent the mean values
produced by the VDC on Chip1 as the Cal1 voltage is swept across a range of values at 3
different temperatures. The different positions of the dashed vertical lines from each
curve make it clear that the offset voltage needs to change in order to maintain a value of
65 in the VDC. Note that the TGV itself measured from the TG-under-test will also
change as a function of temperature. This situation is handled by using the TGVs directly
in the calibration process (as opposed to using a special voltage source).
Calibration is carried out by enabling each of a select, distributed group of TGs,
one at a time, and performing a binary search. The search process varies the Cal1 voltage
offset until the TG-under-test produces a specific TC value. The process is illustrated in
Fig. 15(b) using the 85ºC Cal1-TC curve from Fig. 15(a). The initial limits are set to 500
mV and 770 mV. The 1st trial selects the midpoint between these limits, i.e., 635 mV.
Note this midpoint voltage is the sum of the TGV and the offset voltage that is being
tuned in the search. The 1st trial produces a TC of approx. 68, which is larger than the
target. Therefore, the next trial uses 635 mV as the upper limit and the new midpoint
voltage becomes 568. The 2nd trial produces a TC of 35, so 568 is used as the lower limit
for the new midpoint. The process continues until an offset is found that produces a TC of
65. The binary search process is repeated using 9 TGs as a means of obtaining a value
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that best approximates the average behavior. The median value from the 9 calibration
tests is used as the final offset, which is added to all subsequent TGVs measured at this
TV corner.
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Unstable Bits – Cause and Effect

In our experiments, we found that unstable bits, defined as bits that are susceptible to
‘flipping’ because their TGVDs and VODs (for the TG-PUF and IPUF) or PGVDs (for
the PG-PUF) are very similar, actually reduce several quality metrics associated with the
overall bitstring, including inter-chip HD and NIST statistical test scores [22][70].
Moreover, including unstable bits in the bitstring requires the inclusion of error correction
[19] and Helper Data schemes [24] that weaken security and increase overhead. An
alternative scheme called thresholding that identifies and discards unstable bits, was
proposed in [22][70] to address the unstable bit issue. However, this thresholding scheme
eliminates a large percentage of the bits indicating that a large percentage of the bits
produced by the PUFs are unstable and thus, unusable.
Bit flips occur when the relative ordering of a pair of TGVDs, VODs, or PGVDs
defined during enrollment reverse order during regeneration at different TV conditions.
This manifests itself as a reversal in order of a pair of TCDs for a specific TV, as
illustrated in Fig. 16, since TCD is the VDC-digitized representation of the TGVD, VOD,
or PGVD voltages. Therefore, from Fig. 16 it is clear that the reversal of the slope from
positive to negative or vice versa is what constitutes a bit flip. This reversal is much more
likely to occur for pairs of TGVDs, VODs, or PGVDs that are similar in magnitude.
Since we observe a significant number of bit flips with changing TV, it implies that the
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individual TGV, VO, or PGV values do not change equally with TV changes, causing
non-linear shifts in TGVDs, VODs, and PGVDs with TV changes. Upon investigation of
this hypothesis using data collected from our chips, we were able to confirm this
hypothesis. Figs. A22, A23, and A24 in Appendix A illustrate this based on
representative data from one of our chips. Fig. A22 illustrates how the 8 TGV voltages
(for the 8 stacked TGs) measured on one of the SMCs of our NFET TG-PUF change with
changing TV. As can be seen by the circled points, the TGV voltages do not change
equally with changing TV for every stacked TG. These unequal changes in the individual
TGVs cause non-linear and disproportionate shifts in the TGVD with TV. Fig. A23
illustrates this same idea for the I-PUF and the magnified view of the circled region of
Fig. A23 displayed in Fig. A24 shows the cause of the bit flips. In Fig. A24, the first and
second VODs are each calculated by taking the difference in VOs between paths 3 and 4
(of 8) and paths 4 and 5 (of 8) respectively. The enrollment condition establishes the
reference for the relative difference in the VOD values and as can be seen, the two VOD
values at 85C, 1.2V exhibit a reversal in relative difference as compared to the enrollment
condition. Thus, the 85C, 1.2V VO voltage pairings are responsible for the bit flip. It is
evident that the underlying unequal shifts in VOs with TV are responsible for the nonlinear and disproportionate shifts in the VODs when a VO pairing is taken.
In order to understand the reason for these bit flips in the TG-PUF and I-PUF, it is
essential to understand the physical behavior of the transistors that causes unequal shifts
in TGVs and VOs at different TV’s. Similarly, in order to understand the cause for these
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bit flips in the PG-PUF, it is essential to understand the physical behavior of the power
grid that causes unequal shifts in PGVs at different TVs.

Fig. 16. Illustrative example of a bit flip

4.1 Unstable Bits in the TG-PUF

It is well-known that the On-Resistance (Ron) of transistors change non-linearly with TV
and the Ron shifts with Temperature are a function of both the VGS and VDS of the
transistor (operating region of the transistor) [74].
Using the NFET TGs as an example and referring to Fig. 9 (b), it is clear that the
TG-PUF primitive works as a voltage divider circuit, the intermediate voltages of which
are a function of the Ron of the transistors. (5) illustrates the dependence of the TGV
voltage Vy on the individual transistor Ron at a certain TV.

1
 R1 
Vy  VDD 

V
DD

R9
 R1  R9 
1
R1
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where R1 is the Ron of TG1 (Stack NFET TG) and R9 is the Ron of TG9.
Let us define X1 as the % change in Ron of TG1 at a certain TV from the Ron of
TG1 at the enrollment condition (25C, 1.2V) and X9 as the % change in Ron of TG9 at a
certain TV from the Ron of TG9 at the enrollment condition. Note that X1 or X9 would be
positive for a % increase and negative for a % decrease. Therefore, Vy at a TV other than
enrollment is:

VDD

1
R9 (1  X 9)
1

R1 (1  X 1)

(6)

Thus, it is evident that the TGV voltage at a certain TV is inversely proportional to the
ratio of the Ron of the two transistors at enrollment conditions of 25C, 1.2V (this is the
temperature insensitive term) and the ratio of the (1 + %) change in Ron in those
transistors with respect to their values at enrollment.
Figs. 17 (a) - 17 (b) depict an example of the TG-PUF primitives involved in the
calculation of two TGVD values. For example, the first TGVD (TGVDa) is calculated by
taking the difference of the TGVs of path 1 and path 2 in SMC a while the second TGVD
(TGVDb) is calculated by taking the difference of the TGVs of path 1 and path 2 in SMC
b.
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Fig. 17. NFET TG-PUF primitive for (a) SMC a (b) SMC b
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Now, referring to (6), the TV dependence of the difference in the TGV voltages i.e.,
TGVDa for SMC a is:

TGVDa =





DD 





V

1
1

R9 a (1  X 9 a )
R9 a ' (1  X 9 a ' )
1
1
R1a (1  X 1a )
R 2 a (1  X 2 a )











(7)

and for SMC b is:
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1

R9b (1  X 9b)
R9b' (1  X 9b' )
1
1
R1b (1  X 1b)
R 2b (1  X 2b)











(8)

In (7) and (8), the subscripts 1 and 2 refer to the TGV pairing (stacked NFETs
TG1a and TG2a or TG1b and TG2b) involved in the specific TGVD calculation, while
the subscripts a and b refer to SMC a and SMC b. It should be noted that at a cursory
glance at Figure 17 (a), the Ron of TG9a (or R9a) and the % change in R9a with TV (or X9a)
appear to be unchanged for the TGV pairing being compared to generate the TGVD
value. However, this is inaccurate because although TG9a is common for the TGV
pairing, the TGV magnitudes are not the same for the pairing and it is the TGV
magnitude that determines the VGS, the VDS, the operating region, and the Ron value of
TG9a, and therefore the amount of shift of Ron of TG9a with changing TV. These

64

Chapter 4. Unstable Bits – Cause and Effect
different on-resistances and % changes in on-resistance with TV from enrollment are
designated by R9a, R9a’, X9a, and X9a’ in (7).
Upon inspection of (7) and (8), it is evident that the shifts in TGVD with changing
TV are non-linear and disproportional. Furthermore, it is evident that these non-linear
shifts are a strong function of the ratio of the individual transistor Ron values, which
change with TGV. Therefore, when comparing two digitized TGVD values to generate a
bitstring, it is these non-linear shifts in TGVD with TV that is the primary cause of bit
flips. As expected, this same behavior is observed with the TCDs. Therefore, to illustrate
this phenomenon in a clear manner, the disproportionate shifts in TCDs with TV for a
particular TCD comparison (which would result in a bit flip) from one of our chips is
shown in Fig. 81. Fig. 81 is representative of the problem associated with the
disproportional TCD and TGVD shifts seen that are responsible for the bit flips in the
bitstrings generated from our chips.

4.2 Unstable Bits in the PG-PUF

As stated earlier, the PG-PUF is based on resistance variations that occur in the metal
wires of the chip’s power grid [21][22]. The TV stability of the PG-PUF has a direct
bearing on the number of unstable bits produced by the PUF. A significant benefit of
using metal structures is that “noise-related” variations, such as those introduced by TV
variations, result in linear changes to the measured voltages. This linear scaling
characteristic allows the relative magnitude of two voltages to remain fairly consistent
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across changes in TV, which in turn improves the stability of the PUF to bit-flips, when
compared, for example to PUFs which leverage transistor-based variations, e.g., TGPUFs.
The temperature dependence of the electrical resistance of a conductor, such as a
copper wire, can be linearly approximated by the following equation:

R(T )  Ro  Ro(T  To)

(9)

where α is called the temperature coefficient of resistance which is an empirical
parameter measured at a reference temperature, To is a fixed reference temperature
(usually room temperature), and Ro is the resistance at temperature To.
It should be noted that the shorting transistors from Fig. 8 are very large (57x
minimum size) and therefore exhibit smaller variations with TV in comparison to
minimum-sized transistors. While these variations are small, we still eliminate them by
dividing the PGV voltages by the shorting current and use the term PGERs, for Power
Grid Equivalent Resistances, to refer to them. In order to get as ‘pure’ a form as possible
of the PGERs, we also subtract the leakage voltage and leakage current from the values
measured with the shorting transistors enabled. Similar to the creation of PGVDs from
PGVs, we create PGER differences (PGERDs) by subtracting pairings of PGERs.
In order to determine the magnitude of the TV variations (or ‘TV noise’), we
calibrate the PGVD and PGERD data. Calibration removes the DC offsets introduced by
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TV noise in the data but preserves the variation. Calibration is carried out by computing
the mean PGERD and PGVD over the entire set of SMCs for a given metal layer pairing
and TV corner. Correction factors are then computed by subtracting the mean value at
each of the TV corners from a reference TV corner. In our case, the reference is the data
collected at 25C, 1.2V (enrollment conditions). The correction factors are then added to
the corresponding data from the TV corners.

4.3 Unstable Bits in the I-PUF

An illustration of the I-PUF primitive is shown in Fig. 18. For representative purposes,
only 2 of the 8 primitive paths have been shown in Fig. 18 for a given SMC. Just as was
in the case of the TG-PUF, the Ron of the I-PUF transistors also change non-linearly with
TV and the Ron shifts with temperature are a function of both the VGS and VDS of the
transistors (operating region of the transistors) [74].
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Fig. 18. I-PUF primitive

The I-PUF primitive also works as a voltage divider circuit, the intermediate voltages of
which are a function of the Ron of the transistors. For example for path 1 in Fig. 18, (10)
illustrates the dependence of the voltage VO1 on the individual transistor Ron at a certain
TV.
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1
 RN 1 
VO1  VDD 

V
DD

RP1
 RN 1  RP1 
1
RN 1

(10)

where RN1 is the sum of the Ron of NFET1n (stacked NFET) and NFET9n and RP1 is the
sum of the Ron of PFET1p (stacked PFET) and PFET9p, all at enrollment conditions
(25C, 1.2V).
Similar to the TG-PUF, let us define XN1 as the % change in RN1 at a certain TV
from the RN1 at the enrollment condition and XP1 as the % change in RP1 at a certain TV
from the RP1 at the enrollment condition. Note that XN1 or XP1 would be positive for a %
increase and negative for a % decrease. Therefore for path 1, VO1 at a TV other than
enrollment is:

VDD

1
RP1 (1  XP1)
1

RN 1 (1  XN 1)

(11)

The calculation of a VOD value can also be understood by referring to Fig. 18. For
example, a VOD value could be calculated by taking the difference of the VOs of path 1
and 2. Referring to (11) and altering subscripts to reflect path 2, this VOD can be written
as:
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(12)

where R1p, R9p, R1n, R9n, R2p, R9p’, R2n, and R9n’ are the individual resistances of the
transistors indicated by the subscript. The distinction drawn between R9p and R9p’(or R9n
and R9n’) is because of the fact that although these are the resistances of the same
common transistor, their magnitudes are different when computing two different VOs as
the resistances of transistors 9n and 9p change as a function of VO. XN2 and XP2 are the %
changes in RN2 (defined as R2n + R9n’) and RP2 (defined as R2p + R9p’) respectively, from
their values at the enrollment condition.
Upon inspection of (12) it should be clear that shifts in VOD with TV will be nonlinear and disproportional. It is further evident that the % shifts in the individual transistor
resistances with TV (from enrollment) contribute to the non-linearity as a weighted
function of the individual transistor resistances, e.g. if R1p > R9p, then the magnitude of the
% change in R1p with TV will dominate in the overall % change of the combined
transistor resistances term (XP1). Therefore, when comparing digitized versions of two
VODs to generate a bit string, these non-linear and disproportionate shifts of the
individual VODs with changing TV are what leads to bit flips.
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As discussed earlier, TCDs are computed by subtracting TCs within the same SMC as a
means of eliminating the voltage bias introduced by the sense wires. Computing
differences also has the benefit of significantly increasing the number of bits that can be
produced from each chip. For example, for the TG-PUF, 2380 TCDs are produced from
the 680 NFET TCs.
Using difference values, however, has two main drawbacks. First, subtracting two
TCs reduces the signal-to-noise ratio because the noise from two separate measurements
is combined in the difference. More importantly, TCDs ‘re-use’ the base entropy of the
array, therefore, re-use makes model building attacks possible in cases where the bitstring
is made public.
As stated previously, the bitstrings generated from our PUFs are categorized into
two types. First are those generated directly by comparing the digitized voltages (TGVDs)
from the PUF with each other and second are those that are generated by converting the
digitized voltages into TCDs with the aid of the on-chip VDC and then comparing those
TCDs with each other to generate the bitstring. The results presented include those for
both the voltage-comparison derived bitstrings and the VDC-derived bitstrings.
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5.1 Thresholding Technique

The thresholding scheme shares characteristics with the shielding function proposed in
[75] but is simpler because it is based entirely on strong bits, referred to as ‘robust’ bits in
the reference. This fact changes the nature of the public data and eliminates information
leakage that, although unlikely, is possible with shielding functions.
A thresholding technique as a means of dealing with model-building attacks and
preventing information leakage in the public helper data is proposed. Our thresholding
technique discards TCD (or TGVD) comparisons that are susceptible to producing bit
flips in the bitstring.
Bit flips occur when the relative ordering of a pair of TCDs (or TGVDs) defined
during enrollment reverse order during regeneration. This is much more likely to occur
for pairs of TCDs (or TGVDs) that are similar in magnitude. It is shown in the
experimental results that it is possible to define a threshold that filters all TCD (or
TGVD) pairings that introduce bit flips during regeneration at one or more of the TV
corners. The threshold is derived using the distribution characteristics of TCDs (or
TGVDs) obtained during enrollment, which is carried out in the experiments at 25ºC and
1.20V.
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5.1.1 Thresholding technique applied to the TG-PUF

Using the data derived from the VDC, Fig. 19 shows the TCD enrollment (at 25ºC, 1.2V)
distributions for NFETs and PFETs from one of our chips (Chip1). It is clear from the
spread of the distributions that the NFET TCDs have more variation than the PFET
TCDs, the reasons for which are outlined in Section 3.2.

Fig. 19. TG-PUF enrollment NFET (left) and PFET (right) TCD distributions with 2,380
components from Chip1, with inter-percentile ranges delineated.

Without using the VDC and just using the data derived from TGV voltage comparisons,
Figs. 20 and 21 shows the TGVD enrollment (at 25ºC, 1.2V) distributions for NFETs and
PFETs from Chip1 respectively. It is clear from the spread of the distributions that the
NFET TGVDs have more variation than the PFET TGVDs, the reasons for which are
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explained in section 3.2. The greater underlying variation in the NFET voltages as
compared to the PFET voltages are depicted in Figs. A4 and A6 in Appendix A.

Fig. 20. Enrollment NFET TGVD distributions with 2,380 components from one chip
(Chip 1), with inter-percentile ranges delineated.

Fig. 21. Enrollment PFET TGVD distributions with 2,380 components from one chip
(Chip 1), with inter-percentile ranges delineated.
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The objective is to derive a threshold from these distributions that serves three
primary goals: 1) avoids bit flips under different TV conditions in the subsequent bit
generation phase, 2) preserves as many strong bits as possible for each chip and 3) makes
the number of strong bits as consistent as possible across chips, i.e., scales with the range
of variation that occurs on each chip. We define strong bits as those generated by TCD or
TGVD comparisons where the differences in the TCDs or TGVDs exceed the threshold
and those that do not flip during regeneration of the bitstring at any TV.
In our experiments, we found the limits defined by the two vertical lines labeled
5% and 95% in Figs. 19, 20, and 21 achieve these goals. These limits capture the spread
of the distribution while ignoring the outliers on the tails of the distributions, which,
when included, introduce large variations in the number of strong bits preserved across
the chip population, i.e., they degrade criteria 3 above. We then multiply the 2 interpercentile ranges defined as the distances between these limits by 2 scaling factors, one
for NFETs and one for PFETs, to define the 2 TCD or TGVD thresholds for the chip. The
scaling factors are set to 0.42 (NFET) and 0.39 (PFET) for the TGVD voltage analysis
and 0.53 (NFET) and 0.78 (PFET) for the TCD analysis. These scaling factors were
derived by analyzing the bitstrings across all 9 TV corners and tuning the values until no
bit flips occurred.
Figs. 22(a) and (b) provide an illustration of the thresholding process applied
using the VDC-derived TCD data from one of the chips (Chip1) for the TG-PUF NFETs.
The graphs plot bit number along the x-axis against the differences of the TCDs being
compared. Only the first 390 strong bits are shown. The horizontal lines at 9.7 and -9.7
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delineate the threshold boundaries for the NFET TCDs, which are derived from Fig. 19
using a scaling factor of 0.53. Fig 22(a) shows those TCD differences which produce
strong bits during enrollment. From Fig. 22(a), the bitstring is generated by defining the
TCD differences greater than the positive threshold value (+Tr) as 1’s and the differences
smaller than the negative threshold value (-Tr) as 0’s. In addition to generating the secret
bitstring, a thresholding bitstring is also constructed during enrollment which indicates
which comparisons produce strong bits and which produce weak bits. The thresholding
bitstring is recorded in public data storage, and using techniques such as run-length
encoding (explained in a later section), is proportional in size to the secret bitstring. This
type of public data reveals nothing about the secret bitstring, and represents the helper
data for our PUF. It should be noted that the thresholding process is implemented only
during enrollment, and is disabled during regeneration.
Fig. 22(b) superimposes the TCD difference data points generated under the
remaining 8 TV corner experiments, which represent the regeneration scenarios in our
experiments. The thresholding bitstring is consulted to ensure regeneration uses the same
comparisons as enrollment. The data points associated with the regenerations appear
above and below the enrollment data points. Only those that move toward 0 line are
problematic however. Although none occur in these plots, points that move over the 0
line from above or below indicate the relative ordering has changed in the TCD pairing.
A bit flip will occur during regeneration if this condition is met. Fig. 23 illustrates the
threshold method for the Chip1 TG-PUF PFETs using the VDC-derived TCD data.
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Fig. 22. Threshold method showing the first 390 strong bit comparisons for Chip1 during
(a) enrollment and (b) regeneration across 8 TV corners for the NFETs in the TG-PUF
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Fig. 23. Threshold method showing the first 9730 (out of 2,831,010) TCD comparisons
during enrollment for the Chip1 PFET

Fig. 24 provides an illustration of the thresholding process applied using the
voltage-derived TGVD data from one of the chips (Chip1) for the TG-PUF NFETs. The
graphs plot bit number along the x-axis against the differences of the TGVDs being
compared at enrollment conditions (25C, 1.2V). Only the first 500 bits are shown. The
horizontal lines at 10.9mV and -10.9mV delineate the threshold boundaries for the NFET
TGVDs, which are derived from Fig. 20 using a scaling factor of 0.42. Fig 24 shows
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those TGVD differences which produce strong bits during enrollment. From Fig. 24, the
bitstring is generated by defining the TGVD differences greater than the positive
threshold value as 1’s and the differences smaller than the negative threshold value as 0’s.
Fig. 25 illustrates the threshold method using the voltage-derived TGVD data for the
Chip1 TG-PUF PFETs.

Fig. 24. Threshold method showing the first 500 (out of 2,831,010) TGVD voltage
comparisons during enrollment for the Chip1 NFETs
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Fig. 25. Threshold method showing the first 500 (out of 2,831,010) TGVD voltage
comparisons during enrollment for the Chip1 PFETs

The TCD differences plotted in Figs. 22 and 23 span a larger range than the TCDs used to
compute the inter-percentile range from Fig. 19 because the TCDs themselves are both
positive and negative and therefore, their differences will have a larger range. It should be
clear that the wider the TCD distribution, the larger the magnitude of the differences
between TCDs. Despite their larger range, only about 21% of the 2,831,010 possible
comparisons, i.e., approx. 595,000 bits, survive the thresholding for NFETs. A similar
analysis using the TGVD voltages shows approx. 33% surviving the thresholding, which
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suggests that the digitization process adds substantially to the noise. This is even more
dramatic in the PFET analysis, where approx. 7% of the TCDs survive and approx. 36%
of the TGVDs survive. The smaller variation in the PFET TCDs reduces the signal-tonoise for the VDC even further. However, the 832,343 TCD-based bits for this chip that
survive are reproducible across the TV corners and exhibit excellent statistical
characteristics. Table II below summarizes these results for the Chip1 TG-PUF while
Table III summarizes the results for all 63 chips tested. These results from Chip1 are
representative of the results seen from all the chips in the population.

Table II: Threshold and length of VDC-derived and voltage-derived bitstrings for Chip 1
TG-PUF

Interpercentile
range
Threshold
scaling
factor
Threshold
% of
strong bits
Total
strong
bitstring
length
Truncated
bitstring
length

VDC-derived bitstrings
NFET
PFET
18.4
11.5

Voltage-derived bitstrings
NFET
PFET
26mV
13.5mV

0.53

0.78

0.42

0.39

+/- 9.7
21%

+/- 8.9
7%

+/- 10.9mV
33%

+/- 5.2mV
36%

832,343 bits
(14.7%)

1,953,397 bits
(34.5%)

725,230 bits
(12.8%)

1,901,845 bits
(33.6%)
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Table III. Threshold and ranges of VDC-derived and voltage-derived bitstrings for the
TG-PUF from all 63 chips

Range of
Interpercentile
range
Threshold
scaling
factor
Range of
Threshold

Range of
% of
strong bits

VDC-derived bitstrings
NFET
PFET
15.7 (Chip9) –
8.2 (Chip41) –
23.9 (Chip56)
11.7 (Chip2)

Voltage-derived bitstrings
NFET
PFET
25.12mV
10.7mV
(Chip9) –
(Chip34) –
36.9mV
15.56mV
(Chip21)
(Chip13)

0.53

0.78

0.42

0.39

+/- 8.32 (Chip9)
to +/- 12.6
(Chip56)

+/- 6.4 (Chip41)
to +/- 9.1
(Chip2)

19.3% - 22.9%

5.6% - 8.05%

+/- 10.55mV
(Chip9) to +/15.5mV
(Chip21)
31.3% - 34.1%

+/- 4.17mV
(Chip34) to +/6.06mV
(Chip13)
34.9% - 37.9%

From Table III, it can be seen that there is a considerable spread in the distribution
of the TGVDs and TCDs of the 63 chips, signified by the range of the inter-percentile
ranges. However, it can be seen that the threshold technique does a good job in keeping
the preserved bits, represented by the % of strong bits, fairly consistent across the 63
chips. Even though the TGVD and TCD distributions of the chips have a large range, the
% of strong bits preserved stays fairly consistent and does not suffer for the chips with
tighter distributions. Therefore, this highlights the importance of scaling the threshold of
each chip as a function of its specific distribution as that is the only way to ensure a
consistent level of strong usable bits across all chips.
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The next few pages capture the threshold technique results of all the 63 chips
tested for both the VDC-derived bitstrings and the voltage-derived bitstrings. Fig. 26
depicts the behavior of the thresholds and inter-percentile ranges of each of the chips for
the NFETs and PFETs (denoted by the different color) for the VDC-derived bitstrings.
Each point on this graph is the data from one chip and as expected, the slope of the curve
equals the scaling factor. Fig. 27 depicts this for the voltage-derived bitstrings. As
mentioned earlier, the NFETs have more variation than the PFETs and this exhibits itself
in a wider distribution and thus, a larger inter-percentile range in the NFETs as compared
to the PFETs. Noteworthy is the fact that the scaling factors (slopes) are fairly similar for
the NFETs and PFETs for the voltage-derived bitstrings but are higher for the VDCderived bitstrings and markedly higher for the PFETs. This is because of the added noise
due to the digitization process involved in the VDC-derived bitstrings and the fact that
the TV noise is markedly higher for the VDC-derived bistrings from the PFET. Also, as
shown in Fig. 28 for the voltage-derived bitstrings as an example, the PFET threshold is
directly proportional to the NFET threshold, i.e. chips with a larger (or smaller) NFET
variation also have a larger (or smaller) PFET variation.
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Fig. 26. Threshold versus inter-percentile ranges of VDC-derived bitstrings for the TGPUF from all 63 chips

Fig. 27. Threshold versus inter-percentile ranges of voltage-derived bitstrings for the TGPUF from all 63 chips
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Fig. 28. PFET versus NFET Thresholds for the TG-PUFs from 63 chips

Fig. 29 plots the VDC-derived thresholds versus the voltage-derived thresholds
for all 63 chips. Each point in the graph is a single chip and as can be seen from the
graph, the VDC-derived thresholds are proportional to the voltage-derived thresholds
although the PFETs exhibit a slightly greater slope which is due to the greater resolution
of the VDC at the higher PFET TGV voltages.
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Fig. 29. VDC-derived thresholds versus the voltage-derived thresholds for the TG-PUFs
from 63 chips

As explained earlier, the scaling factor is a constant for all chips and its function is
to scale the inter-percentile range of each chip to produce the threshold for each chip.
This way, each chip has its own unique threshold value that is dependent on its own
unique distribution and this strategy renders the number of strong bits consistent from
chip to chip irrespective of their distributions. Figs. 30 and 31 illustrate this advantage of
the thresholding technique for the VDC-derived and voltage-derived bitstrings
respectively. The lack of dependency of the % of strong bits preserved on the threshold
value is one of the hallmarks of this technique. Had there been a dependency, that would
indicate that chips with too wide or two narrow of a TCD or TGVD distribution would
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generate bitstrings with a disproportionately large or small number of strong bits. This
would render the number of strong bits preserved inconsistent from chip to chip. As can
be seen from Figs. 30 and 31, although there is considerable chip to chip variation in the
thresholds, the % of strong bits preserved is within a fairly tight distribution from chip to
chip.

Fig. 30. % of strong bits versus threshold of VDC-derived bitstrings for the TG-PUF from
all 63 chips
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Fig. 31. % of strong bits versus threshold of voltage-derived bitstrings for the TG-PUF
from all 63 chips

Figs. 32 and 33 depict the margin and the thresholds for the NFET and PFET
VDC-derived bitstrings respectively, of each of the 63 chips tested. The margin is defined
as the largest enrollment TCD (for VDC-derived bitstring) or TGVD (for voltage-derived
bitstring) difference that exhibits a bit flip at some other TV. A small margin value is
desirable as that would mean a smaller scaling factor to insure that difference values
above the threshold do not have bit flips and a smaller scaling factor helps with
preserving more strong bits. The margin should always be a value between +/- threshold
as that will insure that the largest enrollment TCD or TGVD difference that exhibits a bit
flip at some other TV is discarded and denoted as a weak bit in the public data. If the
margin is a value outside the +/- threshold limits, that indicates that a bit being preserved
and denoted as a strong bit exhibits a bit flip at some other TV, and this then defeats the
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purpose of thresholding. It should be clear from the figures below that the scaling factor
for the PUF (which is a constant for all chips) is decided by the chip that has the margin
value closest to the threshold. A smaller scaling factor would cause the thresholding
technique to fail on this chip first as the margin would fall outside of the threshold. This
does have the tradeoff of causing wasted bits in chips where the margin value is farther
away from the threshold as stable bits that do not flip are discarded as they fall within the
threshold. But it can be seen from Figs. 32 and 33 that for every chip, the margin falls
within the +/- threshold range indicating that the thresholding ensures that all enrollment
TCD differences falling outside of the +/- threshold values, defined as strong bits, do not
exhibit any bit flips at any TV. Figs. 34 and 35 depict the margins and thresholds of all
the chips for the voltage-derived bitstrings.

Fig. 32. Threshold and margin of NFET TG-PUF for VDC-derived bitstrings from all 63
chips
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Fig. 33. Threshold and margin of PFET TG-PUF for VDC-derived bitstrings from all 63
chips

Fig. 34. Threshold and margin of NFET TG-PUF for voltage-derived bitstrings from all
63 chips
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Fig. 35. Threshold and margin of PFET TG-PUF for voltage-derived bitstrings from all
63 chips

Next, it was prudent to investigate the relationship of the margin with the
threshold and Figs. 36 and 37 depict that relationship for the VDC-derived and voltagederived bitstrings respectively. Each datapoint is a chip and it can be seen that a larger
margin does translate into a larger threshold to insure no bit flips occur on the enrollment
differences above and below the +/- threshold values.
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Fig. 36. Margin versus Threshold of TG-PUF for VDC-derived bitstrings from all 63
chips

Fig. 37. Margin versus Threshold of TG-PUF for voltage-derived bitstrings from all 63
chips
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The cutoff values for the TG-PUF on all the chips are investigated next. The
cutoff value of a chip is defined as the smallest TCD (for VDC-derived bitstring) or
TGVD (for voltage-derived bitstring) difference at any TV for a comparison identified as
a strong bit during enrollment. A value close to 0.0 here is undesirable because it
represents how close the strong bit is to flipping at some TV other than enrollment. Figs.
38 and 39 depict the cutoff values for all 63 chips for the VDC-derived and voltagederived bitstrings respectively. Noteworthy is the fact that the voltage-derived analysis of
the PFET cutoffs shows that they fall into a much tighter range and are closer to 0.0 than
the NFETs. This is because, for the voltage-derived bitstrings, the threshold of the NFETs
are almost double that of the PFETs so the probability of a strong bit getting close to 0 at
any TV is lower for the NFETs as compared to the PFETs. The VDC-derived analysis of
the cutoff shows that the NFET and PFET cutoffs are in a much comparable range,
although the PFETs still do show slightly more points closer to the 0.0 value. Again, this
is because of the slightly lower threshold of the PFET as compared to the NFET for the
VDC-derived bitstrings. It should be noted that each point in these graphs is one chip and
as can be seen from Figs. 38 and 39, the chip 26 NFETs exhibit a cutoff of 0.0 which
means that this specific strong bit with the smallest difference in TCDs is right at the edge
of flipping.
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Fig. 38. Cutoff values for VDC-derived bitstrings from TG-PUFs of all 63 chips

Fig. 39. Cutoff values for voltage-derived bitstrings from TG-PUFs of all 63 chips
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Next, the relationship between the cutoff values and the thresholds for each of the
chips was investigated via the aid of Figs. 40 and 41. As expected, a weak relationship
exists between the two parameters which means unlike as seen for the margins, the cutoff
of a chip is weakly proportional to the threshold of the chip.

Fig. 40. Cutoff values versus Threshold for VDC-derived bitstrings from TG-PUFs of all
63 chips
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Fig. 41. Cutoff values versus Threshold for voltage-derived bitstrings from TG-PUFs of
all 63 chips

5.1.2 Thresholding technique applied to the I-PUF

Similar to the approach taken to applying the thresholding technique to the TG-PUF in
section 5.1.1, Fig. 42 illustrates the distribution of the voltage-derived VODs from Chip2
at enrollment conditions (25C, 1,2V). Just as in the TG-PUF, the inter-percentile ranges
were defined at the 5% and 95% limits which resulted in a value of 76mV.
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Fig. 42. Enrollment I-PUF VOD distributions with 2,380 components from one chip
(Chip 2), with inter-percentile ranges delineated

As can be seen from Fig. 42, the distribution of the VODs is much wider than
what was seen in the TG-PUF. This reason for this can be understood by examining Fig.
A8 in Appendix A which shows that the distribution of the underlying VO voltages are
much wider indicating that the variation in voltages is much larger in the I-PUF.
Next, the scaling factors were derived by analyzing the voltage-derived bitstrings
across all 9 TV corners and tuning the values until no bit flips occurred. The scaling
factor obtained for the I-PUF was 0.52. We then multiply the inter-percentile range by the
scaling factor to define the threshold of +/- 39.5mV for the chip.
Fig. 43 provides an illustration of the thresholding process applied using the
voltage-derived VOD data from one of the chips (Chip2) for the I-PUF. The graph plots
bit number along the x-axis against the differences of the VODs being compared. Only
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the first 5000 bits are shown. The horizontal lines at 39.5mV and -39.5mV delineate the
threshold boundaries, which are derived from Fig. 42 using a scaling factor of 0.52. Fig
43 shows those VOD differences which produce strong bits during enrollment. From Fig.
43, the voltage-derived bitstring is generated by defining the VOD differences greater
than the positive threshold value as 1’s and the differences smaller than the negative
threshold value as 0’s.

Fig. 43. Threshold method showing the first 5000 (out of 2,831,010) TGVD voltage
comparisons during enrollment for the Chip2 I-PUF
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Table IV captures the key threshold parameters of the voltage-derived bitstrings from the
Chip2 I-PUF while Table V captures that for the voltage-derived bitstrings from all the 62
chips tested.

Table IV: Threshold and length of voltage-derived bitstrings for Chip 2 I-PUF
Voltage-derived bitstrings for Chip2
Inter-percentile range
76mV
Threshold scaling
0.52
factor
Threshold
+/- 39.5mV
% of strong bits
22.18%

Table V: Threshold and range of voltage-derived bitstrings for the I-PUF from all 62
chips
Voltage-derived bitstrings for all 62 chips
Range of Inter58.78mV (Chip31) – 86.29mV (Chip36)
percentile range
Threshold scaling
0.52
factor
Range of Threshold
+/- 30.56mV (Chip31) to +/- 44.87mV (Chip36)
Range of % of strong
20.57% - 23.19%
bits
Truncated bitstring
582554
length
(20.5%)

From Table V, it can be seen that there is a considerable spread in the distribution
of the VODs of the 62 chips, signified by the range of the inter-percentile ranges.
However, it can be seen that the threshold technique does a good job in keeping the
preserved bits, represented by the % of strong bits, fairly consistent across the 62 chips.
Therefore, this highlights the importance of scaling the threshold of each chip as a
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function of its distribution as that is the only way to ensure a consistent level of strong
usable bits across all chips.
Upon analysis of the VDC-generated bitstrings for the I-PUF, it was found that the
thresholding technique could not be applied to these bitstrings to completely eliminate all
bit flips. A constant scaling factor that would eliminate all bit flips on all the chips was
unattainable and a scaling factor up to a value of 1.0 was tested and still yielded bit flips
on several of the chips. The number of strong bits was also drastically reduced at this
scaling factor to the point of being impractical for use. Upon investigation of the raw IPUF TC data from the VDC, it was discovered that the reason for these results was that
numerous TC counts were maxed out at the 120 limit of the VDC and thus, recorded as
120. What that meant is that several TC counts that would be recorded as a finite number
greater than 120 were recorded simply as 120 due to the VDC maximum limit being 120.
This effectively resulted in erroneously registering a bit flip at a certain TV when in
reality, this would likely not be a bit flip had the correct TC count (greater than 120) been
recorded. The VDC’s maximum limit of 120 bits was not able to handle the large voltage
variation of the I-PUF. As stated earlier, considering an approximate resolution of
1bit/mV for the VDC means that the VDC can faithfully digitize about 120mV of voltage
variation. However, depending on the TV corner, the I-PUF voltage variation ranges
anywhere from 140mV to 256mV (see Fig. A8 in Appendix A) which was well above the
capacity of the VDC. On the other hand, the NFET and PFET TG-PUF exhibited a
voltage variation in the range of 80mV and 40mV, respectively (see Figs. A4 and A6 in
Appendix A), which was well within the 120 bit capacity of the VDC.
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Due to the above reasons, the VDC-generated bitstrings were deemed unusable
for the I-PUF. The solution to this would be to implement a VDC with greater capacity so
that TC counts above 120 can be registered.
The above issue is better visualized by plotting the threshold and margin values of
each chip as depicted in Fig. 44 for the VDC-derived bitstring. As explained earlier, the
margin should always fall within the +/- threshold limits in order to ensure that all
enrollment TCD differences falling outside of the +/- threshold values, defined as strong
bits, do not exhibit any bit flips at any TV. As can be seen from Fig. 44, the margins for
every chip fall outside the +/- threshold limits indicating that the largest enrollment TCD
difference with a bit flip at some TV is being preserved and denoted as a strong bit since
it is outside the threshold limits. This is contrary to the goal of thresholding. The solution
to this would be to increase the scaling factor to increase the threshold limits, but as
described earlier, the tradeoff to this would be the preservation of a fewer number of bits.
The data presented in Fig. 44 is using a scaling factor of 1.0 and as can be seen from Fig.
45, the % of bits preserved with a scaling factor of 1.0 is below a dismal 4.5%. Therefore,
as described earlier, the large voltage variation in the I-PUF and the inability of our VDC
range in handling this limits us to using only the voltage-derived bistrings for the I-PUF.
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Fig. 44. Threshold and margin of I-PUF for VDC-derived bitstrings from all 62 chips

Fig. 45. % of strong bits of VDC-derived bitstrings by chip for the I-PUF from all 62
chips
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The next few pages capture the threshold technique results of all the 62 chips
tested for the voltage-derived bitstrings. Fig. 46 depicts the behavior of the thresholds and
inter-percentile ranges of each of the chips. Each point on this graph is the data from one
chip and as expected, the slope of the curve equals the scaling factor.

Fig. 46. Threshold versus inter-percentile ranges of voltage-derived bitstrings for the IPUF from all 62 chips

As explained earlier, the scaling factor is a constant for all chips and its function is
to scale the inter-percentile range of each chip to produce the threshold for each chip.
This way, each chip has its own unique threshold value that is dependent on its own
unique distribution and this strategy renders the number of strong bits consistent from
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chip to chip irrespective of their distributions. Fig. 47 illustrates this advantage of the
thresholding technique for the voltage-derived bitstrings. The observed lack of
dependency of the % of strong bits preserved on the threshold value is one of the
hallmarks of this technique.

Fig. 47. % of strong bits versus threshold of voltage-derived bitstrings for the I-PUF from
all 62 chips

As stated earlier, the margin should fall within the limits of +/- threshold and as
can be seen from Fig. 48, this is the case for the voltage-derived bitstrings for all the
chips.
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Fig. 48. Threshold and margin of I-PUF for voltage-derived bitstrings from all 62 chips

The relationship between the margin and threshold is depicted in Fig. 49 for all
the chips and as seen in the case of the TG-PUF as well, there is a distinct relationship
between the two parameters. As the margin gets more positive, so does the threshold.
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Fig. 49. Margin versus Threshold of I-PUF for voltage-derived bitstrings from all 62
chips

Lastly, the cutoff of all the chips is plotted in Fig. 50 and it is evident that none of
the chips exhibit a cutoff of 0.0 indicating that the strong bits of the chips are not close to
flipping. From Fig. 51, as expected, there is only a weak relationship between the cutoff
and the threshold for the chip population tested.
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Fig. 50. Cutoff values for voltage-derived bitstrings from I-PUFs of all 62 chips

Fig. 51. Cutoff values versus Threshold for voltage-derived bitstrings from I-PUFs of all
62 chips
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5.2

Fixed Length Bitstrings and TMR

In actual applications, only a fixed number of bits are needed. With encryption, the values
vary between 128 to 1024 bits, depending on the encryption algorithm. The large number
of bits available from the PUF can be beneficial, however, by allowing a distinct set of
fixed-length secret keys to be generated over time during successive enrollments.
A second possible usage scenario leverages this large pool of strong bits to further
increase the resiliency to bit flip failures, i.e., beyond that provided by thresholding. A
bitstring replication method is proposed that mimics a popular scheme used in fault
tolerance called triple-module-redundancy or TMR. In this technique, a fixed length, e.g.,
1,024-bit, bitstring is generated as described above using the thresholding technique.
TMR is then applied to generate two more copies of the bitstring. The two copies are
generated by parsing the strong bit sequence until a match is found to each bit in the first
bitstring.
During regeneration, a majority voting scheme is applied to each of the columns
in the three identically regenerated bitstrings as a means of avoiding single bit flip
failures. In other words, the final bitstring is constructed by using the majority of the 3
column bits as the final bit for each bit position, i.e., a ‘1’ is assigned in the final bitstring
when 2 or more of the 3 bits in the column are ‘1’, and a ‘0’ otherwise.
Fig. 52 illustrates the proposed thresholding and TMR-based scheme using data
from a hypothetical chip. The x-axis plots a sequence of comparisons that would be used
to generate a bitstring, while the y-axis plots the differences between the pairings of
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TCDs. Each difference reflects the relative ordering of the two TCDs, e.g., positive
difference values indicate that the first TCD is larger than the second. For strong bits, the
TCD difference data points must lie above or below the thresholds, labeled ‘+Tr’ and ‘Tr’ in the figure. This condition, when met, is recorded using a ‘1’ in the thresholding
bitstring shown below the data points. Weak bits, on the other hand fall within the
thresholds and are indicated with a ‘0’. The bold (and blue) ‘0’s indicate strong bits that
are skipped under the TMR scheme.
The TMR-based method constructs 3 identical bitstrings during enrollment as
shown along the bottom of Fig. 52. The left-most bitstring labeled ‘Secret BS’ is
generated from the first 4 strong bits encountered as the sequence of data points is parsed
from left to right. The second bitstring labeled ‘Redundant BS1’ is produced from the
next sequence of data points but has the additional constraint that each of its bits must
match those in the first bitstring. During its construction, it may happen in the continued
left-to-right parsing of the data points that a strong bit is encountered that does not match
the corresponding position in the ‘Secret BS’. In the example, this occurs at the position
indicated by the left-most bold ‘0’ in the thresholding bitstring. Here, we encountered a
strong bit with a value of ‘0’. But the ‘Secret BS’ requires the first bit to be a ‘1’, so this
strong bit is skipped. This process continues until redundant bitstrings BS1 and BS2
bitstrings are constructed.
A PUF that is able to generate strong bit sequences that are locally random (a
quality measured by the NIST tests [1]) ensures that a match occurs for each bit during
the generation of the two copies every 2 bits on average. Under these conditions, it
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follows that a TMR-based bitstring, and its public data, consumes on average 5 times
more strong bits than a non-TMR-based bitstring. The benefit, on the other hand, is a
significant decrease in the ‘probability of failure’, i.e., the likelihood of a bit flip
occurring during regeneration. Moreover, this scheme offers flexibility by allowing a
trade-off between tolerance to bit flips and public data size. Therefore, the number of
strong bits required to generate a secret bitstring of length 4 is approx 5x or 20. From the
example, this is evaluated by counting the number of ‘1’s and bolded ‘0’s in the
thresholding bitstring, which is given as 19. The benefit of creating these redundant
bitstrings is the improved tolerance that they provide to bit flips. For example, during
regeneration, the three bitstrings are again produced, but this time using the thresholding
bitstring to determine which TCDs to compare.

Fig. 52. Secret bitstring generation example using the proposed thresholding and TMRbased method
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In scenarios where the threshold is set too low, it is possible that a strong data
point used in enrollment is displaced across both the threshold and the ‘0’ line because of
different TV conditions in regeneration, causing a bit flip. However, with TMR, a bit flip
can be avoided if no more than 1 bit flip occurs in a single column of the matrix of bits
created from the 3 bitstrings. For example, the first 3 rows of the matrix of bits in Fig. 53
are constructed during regeneration in a similar way to those shown in Fig. 52 for
enrollment. The bottom row represents the final secret bitstring and is constructed by
using a majority vote scheme (in the spirit of TMR). The bit flip shown in the third
column has no effect on the final bitstring because the other two bits in that column are
‘1’, and under the rule of majority voting, the final secret bit is therefore defined as ‘1’.

Fig. 53. Bit flip avoidance illustration using example from Fig. 52

5.3 Probability of failure

As discussed previously, the TMR scheme improves resiliency to bit flips over the
thresholding scheme alone. The curves shown in Fig. 54 illustrate the improvement for
the TG-PUF VDC-derived bitstrings. The scaling factor used for NFETs (the PFET
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scaling factor is also changed proportionally) is plotted along the x-axis against the
probability of failure on the y-axis. The probability of failure is computed at each scaling
factor value by dividing the number of bit flips that occur in all 63 chips by the total
number of strong bits produced. The curve on the left is the result obtained using the
TMR + thresholding technique, while the curve on the right uses only thresholding. Both
curves are exponential in shape. From the positions of the curves, it is clear that the TMR
scheme requires a lower scaling factor, 0.34 vs. 0.53, before any bit flips occur. Using
0.53 as the scaling factor, the probability of failure is 1.1e-6 with thresholding but
improves significantly to 1.5e-12 after adding TMR. These values were obtained by
fitting the discrete-valued curves produced from repeatedly running the analysis at
different scaling factors with exponential functions.

Fig. 54. TG-PUF NFET TCD scaling factor (x-axis) vs. probability of failure (y-axis)
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Fig. 55(a) shows the data for the TMR + thresholding curve in Fig. 54 with the
fitted exponential curve. The exponential is clearly a good fit to the data points. Fig. 55(b)
shows a blow-up of the region around the NFET scaling factor of 0.53 from which the
estimate of 1.5e-12 was derived.

Fig. 55. (a) TMR probability of error curve and (b) blow-up of the designated region. The
discrete curve is fitted with a superimposed exponential function.

Performing a similar analysis to assess the benefits of a TMR+threshold technique
versus just a threshold technique for the voltage-derived bitstrings of the I-PUF results in
the data graphed in Fig. 56. As seen before, the y-axis of the graph represents the
probability of failure while the x-axis represents the scaling factor. The probability of
failure is computed at each scaling factor value by dividing the number of bit flips that
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occur in all 62 chips by the total number of strong bits produced. The curve on the left is
the result obtained using the TMR + thresholding technique, while the curve on the right
uses only thresholding. Both curves are exponential in shape. From the positions of the
curves, it is clear that the TMR scheme requires a lower scaling factor, 0.29 vs. 0.51,
before any bit flips occur. Using 0.51 as the scaling factor, the probability of failure is
5.03e-8 with thresholding. Using a scaling factor of 0.29, the probability of failure using
thresholding jumps to 12.84e-5 but with the TMR+Thresholding technique drops to 5.9e8, which is at the level observed by just the threshold technique although at a larger
scaling factor of 0.51. As mentioned earlier, a smaller scaling factor is desired as it allows
for preservation of more strong bits.

Bit flips using TMR +
Thresholding starts
below scaling factor of
0.29

Bit flips using
Thresholding starts
below scaling factor
of 0.51

Fig. 56. Probability of error curves for TMR+Threshold and only Threshold techniques
applied to the voltage-derived bitstrings from the I-PUF
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5.4 Run-Length Encoding of Public Data

The size of the public (helper) data under the thresholding and TMR-based schemes can
be reduced using compression techniques such as run-length encoding. The benefit of
run-length encoding is its simplicity. Fig. 57 shows an example of a thresholding bitstring
with 26 bits. The long strings of ‘0’s can be run-length encoded by simply counting them
and replacing the ‘0’ sequence with a field which represents the number of ‘0’s in each
sequence. In the example, the run-length encoded bitstring uses 19 bits instead of 26. The
longer the sequences of ‘0’s, the more efficient the scheme becomes. The best choice for
the field width depends on the nature of the public data, i.e., the average length of the ‘0’
strings.

Fig. 57. Examples of run-length encoding as a compression technique to reduce public
data size. Original public data string has 26 bits. Run-length encoded using a field width
of 4 yields 19 bits

The public data for the TCD analysis of the TG-PUF indicates that approx. 14% of the
bits survive the thresholding, and even fewer, approx. 8.4%, are marked with ‘1’s in the
public data when TMR is added. The public data is therefore expected to contain strings
of 0’s with average lengths of approx. 11 under thresholding + TMR. Therefore, a field
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width between 3 and 4 (which allows counting up to 8 and 16, resp.) should be optimal. It
was found that a field width of 5 is best and yields a 42% reduction on average to the size
of the original public data string. The plan is also to explore other compression
techniques in future work.
It should be noted that in addition to compression, obfuscation is required for the
thresholding bitstring when the PUF usage scenario involves authentication. This is true
because the ‘secret’ bitstring is not kept on chip as it is for encryption but rather is also
made public. With both bitstrings available, an adversary can reverse engineer the relative
ordering of the TCDs. In order to prevent this, we propose to obfuscate a portion of the
thresholding bitstring as follows. During enrollment, the first n strong bits, e.g., 128, are
used as a key to encrypt the thresholding bitstring, excluding those public data bits that
correspond to the encryption key itself. These bits do not need to be encrypted because
the key is never made public.
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Statistical Characterization of Bitstrings

6.1 TG-PUF Bitstrings

In this section, we evaluate the several important statistical properties of the voltagederived (TGVD) and VDC-derived (TCD) bitstrings including randomness, uniqueness
and probability of bit flips, e.g., failures to regenerate the bitstring under different
environmental conditions. The TGVD analysis is carried out on bitstrings generated from
digitized voltages obtained from an off-chip voltmeter (no VDC involvement), while the
TCD analysis is carried out on bitstrings generated by the PUF after digitizing the
voltages using an on-chip VDC that is subjected to the same TV corners as the PUF itself.
As discussed earlier, the process of digitizing the voltages using the VDC adds noise and
reduces the number of corresponding strong bits. The penalty of the digitization process
is evaluated by carrying out the same analysis using the TGVDs directly, and serves to
illustrate the best that can be achieved in the absence of digitization noise.
Fig. 58(a) gives the inter-chip hamming distance (HD) distribution using the
TGVDs while Fig. 58(b) shows the distribution using TCDs for the bitstrings after
thresholding was applied for all chips. The graphs plot HD along the x-axis against the
number of instances on the y-axis. With 63 chips, the total number of instances is
63*62/2 = 1,953. The distributions are ‘fitted’ with Gaussian curves to illustrate the level
of conformity they exhibit to this distribution.
117

Chapter 6. Statistical Characterization of Bitstrings
Since HDs must be computed across bitstrings of equal length, it was necessary to
truncate the bitstrings used in Fig. 58 to the length obtained for the chip with the fewest
number of strong bits. This defines the length of all bit strings for the purposes of the HD
analysis. Truncation reduced the lengths to 1,901,845 for the TGVD analysis and 725,230
for the TCD analysis, which are approx. 33.6% and 12.8%, resp., of the maximum
possible length, i.e., 5,662,020 bits. The chip with the longest bitstring, in comparison,
uses 35.6% of the maximum for the TGVD analysis and 15.0% for the TCD analysis. The
term truncated bitstrings is used to refer to the shorter, equal-length bitstrings.

Fig. 58. Inter-chip Hamming Distance using a) TGVDs and b) TCDs.
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The actual average inter-chip HDs listed in Fig. 58 are nearly equal to the ideal value of
50%. In contrast, the average inter-chip HDs for the bitstrings of length 5,662,020, i.e.,
those with the weak bits included (not shown), is 48.4% and 48.5% for TGVD and TCD,
resp., so removing the weak bits improves the inter-chip HDs. The 3σ values shown in
the figure are derived from the Gaussian curves and represent the spread of the
distributions (where smaller is better). These values are small relative to the length of the
truncated bitstrings, e.g., they are only 0.11% and 0.18% of the lengths for the TGVD and
TCD analysis, resp.
The thresholding technique ensured that the average intra-chip HD across all chips
is 0.0% as shown in Fig. 58 for both analyses. However, the underlying noise levels can
be measured by disabling thresholding, yielding average intra-chip HDs of 5.11% and
8.68% for the TGVD and TCD analyses, resp. The increase in the TCD intra-chip HD
over that given for TGVD reflects the noise added by the VDC digitization process. Fig.
59 depicts the intra-chip HDs for each of our chips tested for the unstable VDC-derived
bitstrings (defined as bitstrings generated by disabling thresholding) while Fig. 60 depicts
this for the voltage-derived bitstrings.
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Fig. 59. Intra-chip HD of the unstable VDC-derived bitstrings for the 63 chips tested

Fig. 60. Intra-chip HD of the unstable voltage-derived bitstrings for the 63 chips tested
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The NIST tests [1] look for ‘patterns’ in the bit strings that are not likely to be
found at all or above a given frequency in a ‘truly random’ bit string. For example, long
or short strings of 0’s and 1’s, or specific patterns repeated in many places in the bit string
work against randomness. The output of the NIST statistical evaluation engine is the
number of chips that pass the null hypothesis for a given test. The null hypothesis is
specified as the condition in which the bitstring-under-test is random. Therefore, a good
result is obtained when the number of chips that pass the null hypothesis is large. We
applied the NIST statistical tests to the truncated bitstrings of the 63 chips at a
significance level of 0.01 (the default). The TGVD and TCD bitstrings pass all tests, with
no fewer than 60 passing chips per test (the number required by NIST for the test to be
considered ‘passed’). Moreover, all tests passed the P value-of-the-P values metric. Fig.
61 depicts the NIST test results for the 13 tests applied to the voltage-derived and VDCderived stable bitstrings from the TG-PUF for all 63 chips. As can be seen, at least 61 or
more chips pass all tests with the required number for a pass being 60 chips.
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Fig. 61. NIST test results for the voltage-derived and VDC-derived stable bitstrings

Fixed-length bitstrings were also created using the TMR-based scheme. In the
experiments, we were able to create, on average, 381 1024-bit TMR-based bitstrings per
chip using TGVD data, and 156 on average using TCD data. Although not shown, the
statistical test results are similar to those discussed above for the longer bitstrings.
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6.2 I-PUF Bitstrings

Similar to the TG-PUF analysis in Section 6.1, we evaluate the several important
statistical properties of the voltage-derived (VOD) bitstrings including randomness,
uniqueness and probability of bit flips, e.g., failures to regenerate the bitstring under
different environmental conditions. The VOD analysis is carried out on bitstrings
generated from digitized voltages obtained from an off-chip voltmeter (no VDC
involvement). No VDC-derived bitstrings were evaluated due to the reasons elaborated in
Section 5.1.2. Fig. 62 depicts the inter-chip hamming distance (HD) distribution of the
voltage-derived stable bitstrings after thresholding was applied while Fig. 63 depicts the
distribution of the voltage-derived unstable bitstrings before any thresholding was
applied. The graphs plot HD along the x-axis against the number of instances on the yaxis. With 62 chips tested, the total number of instances is 62*61/2 = 1,891. The
distributions are ‘fitted’ with Gaussian curves to illustrate the level of conformity they
exhibit to this distribution.
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Fig. 62. HD analysis of VOD derived stable bitstrings for the I-PUF based on data
collected from 62 chips

Fig. 63. HD analysis of VOD derived unstable bitstrings for the I-PUF based on data
collected from 62 chips
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Since HDs must be computed across bitstrings of equal length, it was necessary to
truncate the bitstrings used in Fig. 62 to the length obtained for the chip with the fewest
number of strong bits. This defines the length of all bit strings for the purposes of the HD
analysis. Truncation reduced the lengths to 582,554, which is approx. 20.5% of the
maximum possible length, i.e., 2,831,010 bits. The chip with the longest bitstring, in
comparison, uses 23.19% of the maximum possible length. The term truncated bitstrings
is used to refer to the shorter, equal-length bitstrings.
From Fig. 63, it can be seen that before any thresholding is applied to eliminate
weak bits, the average inter-chip HD calculated across all 62 chips was 48.43625% based
on analysis of unstable bitstrings of length 2,831,010. Also, the average intra-chip HD
across the 62 chips and 9 TV corners was 6.186%. Fig. 64 depicts the intra-chip HD of
each of the chips tested based on analyses of the unstable voltage-derived bitstrings.
Recall that the ideal value for inter-chip HD is 50% and for intra-chip HD is 0%. From
Fig. 62, it can be seen that after application of the thresholding technique and eliminating
the weak bits, the average inter-chip HD calculated across all 62 chips increased to
49.9979% based on analysis of truncated stable bitstrings of length 582,554, while the
average intra-chip HD dropped to the ideal value of 0%.
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Fig. 64. Intra-chip HD of each of the 62 chips based on analyses of the unstable voltagederived bitstrings

Similar to the TG-PUF bitstring analyses, NIST tests were performed on the stable
voltage-derived bitstrings generated from the I-PUF. Fig. 65 depicts the results of the 13
NIST tests there were applied to the bitstrings generated from all 62 chips. As can be
seen, atleast 60 of the 62 chips tested passed all the NIST tests and the number of passing
chips required in order to statistically consider a test as a pass was 59.
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Fig. 65. NIST test results for the voltage-derived stable bitstrings from the I-PUF

6.3 Bitstring Construction Strategies – “ABS” vs. “DIFF”

As stated previously, preliminary experimentation with different bitstring construction
strategies revealed the effects of sense wire bias in certain cases that prompted the
selection of a strategy that eliminated the effects of wire bias. Two bitstring construction
strategies, hereon referred to as the “DIFF” and “ABS” methods, were studied using the
TG-PUF as a test vehicle.
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In the DIFF method, voltage differences between consecutive TGVs in the stack
are taken and those differences are then compared with each other in all combinations to
generate a bitstring. Therefore, the bitstring length per chip for the TG-PUF is calculated
as (7 voltage differences X 85 SMCs) X 2 MOS types and then all combinations of that
result. This method generates a bitstring of length 707,000. As stated previously, this
method of bitstring construction eliminates the bias effects of unequal sense wires to the
SMCs.
In the ABS method, the absolute TGV voltages (and not their differences) are
compared with each other in all combinations to generate a bitstring. Therefore, the
bitstring length per chip for the TG-PUF is calculated as (8 voltages X 85 SMCs) X 2
MOS types and then all combinations of that result. This method generates a bitstring of
length 924,000. The bias effects of unequal sense wires to the SMCs should be visible
with this method.
In these preliminary experiments, no testing was done at different temperature and
voltage conditions, so the Intra-chip HD, which is a measure of the reproducibility, was
calculated based on repeated sampling (measurement noise and not TV noise). The TGPUFs on 60 copies of the 90nm chips were tested and the results of those experiments
follow.
The distribution of the HDs for the bitstrings generated using the DIFF and ABS
methods are shown in Figs. 66(a) and (b), resp. HD is plotted along the x-axis against the
number of instances on the y-axis. The total number of instances is given by all
combinations of the chips’ bit strings, i.e., 60*59/2 = 1,770. After removing unstable or
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weak bits using the thresholding technique described previously and a 1mV voltage
threshold, the “stable” bit string lengths reduce, on average, by 15.3% and 4.3% for the
DIFF and ABS analyses, respectively. It is the HD distribution of these “stable” bitstrings
that are depicted in Figs. 66(a) and (b). The size of the bitstrings used in the HD analysis
is smaller still at 588,230 and 874,240 for the DIFF and ABS methods respectively. This
adjustment is necessary because the HD analysis must be carried out on bit strings of
equal length. To accomplish this, the chip with the shortest stable bit string is used to
define the length of all bit strings. Although the number of bits discarded as unstable
using the threshold method is relatively large, the benefits of constructing a stable bit
string in this fashion are significant. The average inter-chip HD was seen to improve for
both the DIFF and ABS methods as a function of applying the thresholding technique to
discard the unstable bits. The superimposed Gaussian curve on the DIFF distribution of
Fig. 66(a) illustrates the distribution is close to ideal, and reflects the power of differential
analysis. The ABS distribution, on the other hand, is skewed somewhat to the left, which
indicates that a component of the bias discussed earlier is still present.
The bias issue associated with the sense wire routing appears to be significantly
reduced using the threshold technique, as depicted by shape of the distribution and results
given in Fig. 66(b). However, the shape of the DIFF distribution is a better fit to a
Gaussian than the ABS distribution and the Std. Dev. is desirably smaller, e.g., 388 vs.
617. The inter-chip HD of the stable bitstrings is clearly superior for the DIFF method
(50.002%) than the ABS method (48.983%). The intra-chip HD of the unstable bit string
from Figs. 66(a) and (b) indicates that the ABS method has a slightly better repeatedly,
129

Chapter 6. Statistical Characterization of Bitstrings
but as stated earlier this was based on repeated sampling and not extensive TV testing.
Again, application of the thresholding technique to bitstrings generated by both methods
reduced the intra-chip HD of the stable bitstrings to the ideal value of 0%.
The length of the bit strings allowed 11 of the 15 NIST statistical tests to be
performed. All tests except the Overlapping Template, Random Excursions, Random
Excursions Variant, and Linear Complexity tests were performed. The ABS bit strings do
poorly, producing 0 passing chips on several tests including Runs, Longest Runs, Approx.
Entropy and Serial for all seeds. The poor performance is caused by the sense wire bias
that still remains in the data and demonstrates that the threshold technique is limited in
how much bias it can remove for the ABS method. In contrast, the DIFF bit strings pass
all tests except 2 Non Overlapping Template tests out of 148 sub-tests, both of which fail
by only 1 chip. For our sample size of 60 chips, the NIST tests consider the tests as a pass
as long as there are at least 57 passing chips. This result clearly demonstrates the power
of differential analysis to extract randomness and eliminate the adverse effects of bias.

Fig. 66. Distribution of HDs using bitstrings generated from (a) DIFF (b) ABS
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7.1 TG-PUF Analyses

Referring to (7) and (8), it is clear that two parameters contribute to the non-linear
behavior of the TGVD shifts with changing TV conditions. First is the ratio of the
individual transistor Ron values at enrollment conditions and their dependency on the
TGV voltage. Second is the % change of the individual transistor Ron with TV from its
Ron value at enrollment conditions. Figs. 67-69 depict these parameters for our collected
dataset from one of the chips (Chip 1). It should be noted that in the rest of this chapter,
when stating VGS and IDS for PFETs, it is implied that it is actually being referred to |VGS|
and |IDS| for PFETs.
From Figs. 67(a) and (b), we see that the Ron ratio changes significantly with TGV
indicating that the two Ron ratios in the denominators of (7) or (8) could be significantly
different. From Figs. 68-69, it is clear that the % changes in Ron with TV also exhibit a
dependency on the TGV values. This is more apparent when referring to Figs. A25-A28
in Appendix A which shows the dependency is more pronounced for the stacked NFETs
and PFETs, due to the fact that they operate in the linear region, indicating that the four %
shifts in Ron in the denominators of (7) or (8) could be significantly different from each
other. Also, it is evident that the % changes in Ron are greater for NFET9 and PFET9 than
those of the stacked NFETs and PFETs for any given TV, with the NFETs
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generally higher than the PFETs. Another noteworthy observation from Figs. 68-69 is that
there is significantly greater noise in the % changes in Ron at 1.08V regardless of the
operating temperature, because the Ron is the highest at 1.08V and therefore is expected to
have a larger variation in deviations from enrollment. The TGV pairings at 1.08V are also
responsible for a large portion of the bit flips due to the greater variation. Explanations
for these observations are provided later in this section.

Fig. 67. Chip1 Ron ratio versus TGV for (a) PFETs (b) NFETs
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Fig. 68. % changes in NFET Ron versus TGV for Chip1
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From Figs. A25 and A26 in Appendix A, it should be noted that the stacked
NFETs, which operate in the linear region, exhibit a larger change from enrollment
conditions as the VDS changes for small VDS values, and a smaller change from
enrollment conditions as VDS changes for large VDS values. From Figs. A27-A28, we see
that this is also true for the NFET9 transistors, which operate in the saturation region,
however a distinct increase in change from enrollment with increasing VDS is not
observed due to the fact that at these much higher VDS levels, the Ron changes with VDS
are much smaller and not noticeable. These behaviors are expected and more
comprehensible when considering the generic IDS vs. VGS curves for changing VDS of a
NFET shown in Fig. A29 in Appendix A.
All these aforementioned factors lead to disproportionate and sometimes
unpredictable shifts in TGVD with TV. Depending on the TGV pairing being compared,
if the Ron ratio in the denominator of the first term in (7) happens to be significantly
different than that in the denominator of the second term, the Ron % change terms in (7)
play a weaker role in determining the shift in TGVD with TV. However, if the Ron ratios
are similar, then the differences between the % change in Ron for NFET9 (or PFET9) and
that of the stacked NFETs (or PFETs) for a given TV will play a dominating role in
dictating the shift in TGVD with TV. These are the key reasons for the bit flips seen
when comparing two different closely-spaced TGVD values at all 9 TV corners.
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Fig. 69. % changes in PFET Ron versus TGV for Chip1

Using the NFET primitive of the TG-PUF as an example and referring to Fig.
9(b), NFET9 always operates in the saturation region whereas the stacked NFETs
(NFET1) operate in the linear region. Thus, R9 > R1. The IDS of MOSFETs exhibit a
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bimodal dependence on temperature [74]. At small VGS values, the IDS generally increases
with increasing temperature whereas it decreases with increasing temperature at large VGS
values. At small VGS values, the threshold voltage’s (VT) dependence on temperature
dominates while at large VGS values, the mobility’s (µn) dependence on temperature
dominates. A typical example of this behavior taken from [74] is illustrated in Fig. 70.
Assuming a constant VDS (as in Fig. 70), this relationship of IDS with temperature can be
an indication of the relationship of Ron with temperature, i.e. increase in Ron with
increasing temperature at larger VGS and decrease in Ron with increasing temperature at
lower VGS.

Fig. 70. Illustration of bimodal dependency of Ron on temperature

Both VT and µn decrease with increasing temperature but they have opposite effects on the
Ron. VT generally decreases at a rate of -2.4mV/ºC. As the temperature increases, a
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decreasing VT leads to a decrease in Ron while a decreasing µn leads to an increase in Ron
leading to the bimodal behavior observed in Fig. 70. All our transistors generally operate
in the larger VGS region so we see an increase in Ron with increasing temperatures for a
fixed VDD voltage. This exhibits itself in the form of the slope of the IDS versus VGS curve
of the MOSFET being inversely proportional to the operating temperature, as shown in
Fig. 70. On the other hand, a decrease in Ron with increasing VDD voltages at a fixed
temperature, is seen for the transistors in our primitive. Due to these changes in Ron with
TV, the TGV voltage also exhibits an increase with increasing temperature and voltage.
With data from one of our chips, these behaviors of the NFET and PFET primitives are
illustrated in Figs. 71 through 77 and Figs. A11 through A13 in Appendix A.
Defining the TV noise of transistor Ron as the standard deviation of the transistor
Ron for the 9 TV corners tested, the summary statistics of all the chips tested revealed that
the Coefficient of Variation (CV), defined as the standard deviation divided by the mean,
for the TV noise in Ron for the stacked NFETs was 15% while that for the NFET9 was
20%. The change in the Ron of the stacked transistors with changing temperature is larger
than that of NFET9 and PFET9, however, the change in Ron of NFET9 and PFET9 with
changing VDD is much larger than the stacked transistors causing the higher overall TV
noise in Ron for NFET9 and PFET9. This larger change in Ron of NFET9 and PFET9 with
changing VDD is consistent with the fact that voltages on 3 (of 4) terminals (G, D, S) of
NFET9 and PFET9 change as VDD changes, whereas the voltage on only 2 (of 4)
terminals (G, D) of the stacked NFETs and PFETs change as VDD changes. The larger
change in Ron of the stacked transistors with temperature is consistent with the fact that
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those transistors operate at a higher VGS and a much lower VDS than NFET9 and PFET9
and thus, operate in the linear region where the changes in Ron with temperature are larger
than in the saturation region. See Figs. 72-73 and Figs. 75-76 for details. It should be
noted that both PFET and NFET transistors exhibit an increasing change in Ron with
changing temperature as the VGS increases for a fixed VDS (or as the VDS decreases for a
fixed VGS [74]. In our case, both the larger VGS and a much lower VDS of the stacked
transistors (that operate in the linear region) as compared to PFET9 and NFET9 (that
operate in saturation region) cause a larger change in Ron with temperature for the stacked
transistors.
It should also be noted from Fig. 75 that for the saturated transistor PFET9, the
changes in Ron with changing temperature get smaller with decreasing VDD. The reason
for this is clear when referring to the PFET9 IDS vs. VGS curves of Fig. A12. A lower VDD
leads to a lower operating VGS for all the transistors and the saturated transistors operate
at a lower VGS than the linear transistors, and therefore closer to the VGS inflection point
below which the temperature dependency of IDS reverses. As can be seen from Fig. A12,
the change in IDS with changing temperature gets smaller with decreasing VGS. Decreasing
VDD is what results in the decreasing VGS in Fig. A12, and as VDD decreases, the VDS of
PFET9 (not shown) is also not constant and is changing. Therefore, these changing
behaviors of VDS and IDS with temperature at different VDD are what cause the Ron
dependency on temperature to change with VDD. This decrease in Ron changes with
changing temperature at lower VDD is more pronounced for the PFET9 as compared to the
NFET9 because PFET9 operates at a lower VGS and VDS than NFET9 (see Fig. 71 and Fig.
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A12) and the inflection point for PFET9 is at a higher VGS (937mV) than NFET9
(870mV); therefore PFET9 operates closer to the VGS inflection point than the NFET9.
The Ron changes with temperature get smaller the closer the transistor gets to operating at
the inflection point. Noteworthy is also the fact that the inflection point of where Ron’s
dependency on temperature reverses will not match the inflection point of where IDS’s
dependency on temperature reverses. This is because unlike in Fig. 70, the VDS of the
transistor also changes with changing VDD and is a central component in determining the
Ron. That is why when analyzing Fig. A12, it appears that the inflection point of Ron
should also be somewhere between a VDD of 1.08V and 1.2V based on the IDS inflection
point. However, as is obvious from Fig. 75, it is somewhere slightly lower than a VDD of
1.08V.

Fig. 71. IDS vs. VGS for NFET9 of Chip1
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Fig. 72. NFET9 Ron changes with TV for Chip1

Fig. 73. Stacked NFETs Ron changes with TV for Chip1
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Fig. 74. NFET TGV changes with TV for Chip1

Fig. 75. PFET9 Ron changes with TV for Chip1
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Fig. 76. Stacked PFETs Ron changes with TV for Chip1

Fig. 77. PFET TGV changes with TV for Chip1
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The CV for the TV noise in Ron for the stacked PFETs was 12.5% while that for the
PFET9 was 17.8%, indicating that the NFETs are more sensitive to TV variations. These
results are summarized in Table VI below. The higher sensitivity of NFETs to TV
variations is mostly due to a higher sensitivity to temperature variations and can be
explained with Fig. A10 in Appendix A. Fig. A10 illustrates the much larger change in
electron mobility as compared to the hole mobility as temperature changes, and the
mobility has a direct effect on the Ron of a transistor.

Table VI: TV Noise of the various transistors in the TG-PUF primitive based on all chips
tested
TV Noise (CV %)
Ron of Stacked NFETs

15%

Ron of NFET9

20%

Ron of Stacked PFETs

12.5%

Ron of PFET9

17.8%

Table VII lists the average calculated TV noise for the voltages and their digitized
form. It can be seen when comparing the TGVD TV noise that the NFETs have a larger
TV noise than the PFETs, and this is consistent with the larger TV noise seen in the
NFET Ron values. It is the TGVD TV noise that dictates the sensitivity of bit flips to TV
variations in the unstable voltage-derived bitstring, as it is the differences of the TGVDs
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that are used to generate the bitstring. Evident is also the fact that the difference operation
for both the TGV and TC result in a lowering of the magnitude of the TV noise. This is
due to the fact that when calculating the TV noise of the TGVs, we are calculating a
standard deviation of the TGV voltages (which are large numbers as evident from Figs.
A4 and A6 in Appendix A) across different TVs and when calculating the TV noise for
the TGVD, we are calculating a standard deviation of the differences in the TGV voltages
(which are smaller numbers as evident from Figs. 20 and 21) across different TVs. The
TGVD TV noise should be proportional to the TGV TV noise because if the standard
deviation (across TV) of the TGV voltages is higher, this increased variation in the TGV
voltages will induce an increase in variation in their differences across TV; this will be
captured in the TV noise or standard deviation of the TGVDs. Also, as can be seen from
Table VII, the magnitude of the TGV TV noise is larger for larger TGV voltages, i.e. the
PFET PUFs that operate with a TGV in the 950mV range exhibit a TGV TV noise of
72.4mV and NFET PUFs that operate with a TGV in the 200mV range exhibit a TGV TV
noise of 26.8mV. That is the reason their values are normalized using the CV (µ/σ) %.
However, it should be clear that the TV noise in TGVD is not dependent on the
magnitude of TGVD as evident from Figs. A20 and A21 in Appendix A. Therefore, it is
not valid to conclude that the NFETs are expected to exhibit a larger TGVD TV noise
magnitude just because their TGVD range is larger; the two are not related. It is however
a valid conclusion that the magnitude of the TGVD TV noise will be higher for higher
TGV voltages as higher TGV voltages will have larger standard deviations and therefore
larger standard deviations of their TGVDs, i.e. a larger TGVD TV noise magnitude. That
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is why the magnitude of the TGVD TV noise is normalized with respect to their
corresponding TGV TV noise, indicated by the percentages. With this in mind, when
comparing the NFET and PFET TGVD TV noise, we would expect a lower value for the
NFETs due to their lower TGV voltages and lower TGV TV noise. But, we see the
opposite which is explained by the significantly higher TV noise in the NFETs.
Also, the lowering of the TV noise magnitude with the difference operation is not
as dramatic for the TCDs as compared to the TGVDs indicating that the TCD TV noise is
much larger in comparison to the TGVD TV noise. The TV noise in the TCD determines
the sensitivity of bit flips to TV variations in the unstable VDC-derived bitstring. This
explains the increased TV noise with digitization and the associated higher intra-chip HD
of the VDC-derived unstable bitstring as compared to that of the unstable voltage-derived
bitstring. A reduced difference in TCD TV noise between NFETs and PFETs is also seen
due to the digitization process. The 2.04X TGVD TV noise for the NFETs compared to
the PFETs reduces to 1.29X TCD TV noise for the NFETs compared to the PFETs.
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Table VII. TGV, TC, TGVD, and TCD TV Noise for Chip1 NFET and PFET

Chip1

TGV TV noise

TC TV noise

TGVD TV

TCD TV

(CV %)

(CV %)

noise

noise

26.8 mV (13.7%)

1.36 bits (2.1%)

0.9 mV (3.3%*)

1.14 bits

NFET

* normalized to
TGV TV noise

Chip1

72.4 mV (7.5%)

1.4 bits (1.6%)

PFET

0.44 mV

0.88 bits

(0.6%*)
* normalized to
TGV TV noise

Fig. 78 illustrates the general behavior of the VDC as a function of changing TV.
Here, the TC is plotted as the Cal1 voltage is swept at different TVs. The mean and 3σ
curves are superimposed. The average 3σ, computed using the individual 3σ in each
curve, is less than 1 for all curves. The small non-linearity in the curves does not degrade
the statistical properties of the bitstrings, as shown below. This figure illustrates the need
for the calibration process described in Section 3.5.4 to compensate for the TV shifts in
the offset voltages. A fixed TGV voltage could cause overflow problems past the 120 bit
capacity in the VDC due to shifts in the curves along the x-axis with changing TV. An
offset voltage and a calibration factor are applied to the TGV voltages before they are
programmed into the Cal1 power supply for the VDC. From Fig. 78, it can be seen that
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the sensitivity of the VDC is approx. 1 TC bit per millivolt change in Cal1. The TGVs for
a typical chip vary over the range of 40 to 80 mV so about half of the 120 bit range of the
VDC is used in our experiments.

Fig. 78. VDC TC versus Cal1 for Chip1 across 9 TV corners

Fig. 79 depicts the behavior of the VDC output (TC) as a function of changing TV for the
NFET TGV voltages after voltage offsets are added to the TGV voltages using the
calibration process described in Section 3.5.4. Fig. 80 depicts this behavior for the
PFETs. It can be seen that the shifts in the curves are greater for changing power supply
voltages than changing temperatures for both NFETs and PFETs. It can also be seen that
the slopes of the curves (or resolution) decreases slightly with increasing power supply
voltages for any given temperature and the shifts of the curves with changing temperature
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get slightly smaller with increasing supply voltage. Two conclusions can be made from
Figs. 79 and 80. First, the resolution of the VDC is about 1 bit/mV which allows
capability to measure variation of up to 120mV as the VDC has a measurement capacity
of 120 bits. Second, the PFETs have a much tighter range of TCs as compared to the
NFETs due to the smaller voltage variation or voltage range for the PFETs.

Fig. 79. TC versus calibrated TGV for the Chip1 NFETs
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Fig. 80. TC versus calibrated TGV for the Chip1 PFETs

Fig. 81 illustrates a bit flip when comparing a TCD from SMC6 with a TCD from SMC7.
It can be seen that this bit flip is caused by the reversal of the relative ordering of the 25C,
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Fig. 81. Illustration of a bit flip in Chip1 NFETs

1.32V TCD comparison which manifests itself as a positive slope, while the slopes for all
the other TV comparisons are negative. On the other hand, when comparing the TCD
from SMC5 with that from SMC6, there are no bit flips as all the slopes are positive.

7.2 PG-PUF Analyses
Referring to (9), it is evident that plotting PGERD versus temperature yields a fit the
equation of which is represented by (13).

PGERD(T) = PGERDo – α(PGERDo)(To) + α(PGERDo)(T)
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In (13), PGERDo – α(PGERDo)(To) is the y-intercept and α(PGERDo) is the slope. Fig. 82
displays this relationship for our collected dataset from one of the chips. Given that we
now know the slopes and y-intercepts of the curves in Fig. 82, we calculate the α to be
0.0025/C and the PGERDo as 0.176Ω at 25C based on our experimental data.

Fig. 82. PGERD versus Temperature for Chip15 VDD grid

Figs. 83 and 84 illustrate the PGERD behavior as a function of TV for both VDD and
GND grids. It can be seen that the PGERDs increase with increasing temperature but
have no dependency on changing power supply voltages.
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Fig. 83. PGERD versus TV for Chip15 in VDD grid

Fig. 84. PGERD versus TV for Chip15 in GND grid
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It is further observed that while the M1-M2 metal layer pairing exhibits larger PGERDs
for the GND grid compared to the VDD grid, the PGERDs for M2-3 and M3-M4 metal
layer pairings are smaller for the GND grid. The PGERDs for the GND grid are expected
to be lower due to a better a current sink to GND, however the larger M1-M2 PGERD in
the GND grid is due to the fact that the tap point for our M1-M2 voltage measurement for
the GND grid was placed in a location that caused the inclusion of some finite routing
wire resistance. This had an additive effect on the M1-M2 PGERD of the GND grid
causing it to be higher than the VDD grid. This also leads to a greater TV noise in the
PGERDs for the M1-M2 pairing of the GND grid, as shown in Table VIII. Fig. 85 shows
that unlike the PGERDs, the PGVD voltages increase with increasing temperature and
voltage.

Fig. 85. PGVD versus TV for Chip15 VDD grid
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Fig. 86 displays the % shifts in PGERDs at different TV conditions from that of its value
at enrollment conditions (25C, 1.2V). This is shown for all three metal pairings and both
the VDD and GND grids.

Fig. 86. % changes in PGERD for VDD and GND grids of Chip15

It is noteworthy from Fig. 86 that the % changes in PGERDs for the VDD grid
exhibit a greater level of noise than the GND grid, and the noise level progressively
increases up the metal layer stack with the M3-M4 metal layer pairing being the noisiest
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for both grids. Therefore, it is these PGERDs that would be responsible for the majority
of the bit flips in our bitstring.
Table VIII quantifies the TV and measurement noise for the calibrated PGERDs
(calibration procedure described in Section 4.2 and [22]) and PGVDs for one of the chips.
The measurement noise, defined as the standard deviation of the repeated 11 samples,
accounts for 65% of the TV noise for the VDD grid and only 20% for that of the GND
grid. Also noteworthy is that the TV noise is 1.6X greater for the PGERDs derived from
the VDD grid than those derived from the GND grid, while the measurement noise is 5X
greater. This is explained by the fact that the capacitance of the GND grid is much larger
than the VDD grid and also better distributed in the substrate.

Table VIII. TV Noise in calibrated PGERDs and PGVDs for VDD and GND grids of
Chip15
TV Noise (mΩ)

Avg TV Noise (CV)

Avg Measurement Noise
(CV)

Calibrated

M1-M2: 1.53

1.53 mΩ

1.0 mΩ

PGERDs for

M2-M3: 1.53

(1.07%)

(0.76%)

VDD grid

M3:M4: 1.53

Calibrated

M1-M2: 1.90

0.98 mΩ

0.2 mΩ

PGERDs for

M2-M3: 0.55

(0.47%)

(0.14%)

GND grid

M3-M4: 0.50
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Furthermore, the greater measurement noise for the VDD grid is largely driven by
the measurements at 1.32V as shown in Fig. 87, which displays the measurement noise in
the PGERDs derived from the VDD grid as a function of TV for the various metal layer
pairings. The reason for the greater measurement noise at 1.32V is the larger voltages
measured at this TV corner and the fact that the instrument's range needed to be changed
to accommodate this larger range.

Fig. 87. PGERD measurement noise for VDD grid of Chip15
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7.3 I-PUF Analyses

Referring to (12), it is clear that two parameters contribute to the non-linear behavior of
the VOD shifts with changing TV conditions. First is the ratio of the sum of the Ron of the
PFET transistors to the sum of the NFET transistors at enrollment conditions and the
dependency of this ratio on the VO voltage. Second is the % change of the combined
PFET or NFET transistor Ron with TV from the Ron value at enrollment conditions. Figs.
88-90, and A18-A19 (in Appendix A) depict these parameters for our collected dataset
from one of the chips (Chip 2). It can be seen from Fig. 88 that the Ron ratio changes
significantly as a function of VO thus indicating that the two Ron ratios in the
denominators of (12) could be significantly different. Fig. 89 illustrates the % changes in
the combined Ron of the 2 PFETs (Ron of stacked PFET + Ron of PFET9p) from that at
enrollment while Fig. 90 illustrates this for the combined Ron of the 2 NFETs (Ron of
stacked NFET + NFET9n). From Figs. 89-90, it is clear that the % changes in Ron with
TV also exhibit a dependency on the VO values or paths being compared. This
dependency is more pronounced for the NFETs indicating that the % shifts in Ron in the
denominator of (12) could be significantly different for the two terms. In addition to this
VO dependency, the NFETs also exhibit a cross-over between the 85C, 1.32V and the 40C, 1.2V curves in Fig. 90 indicating that the VO shifts for these two TV corners could
be even more unpredictable depending on the paths being compared. Also, it is evident
that the % changes in Ron are greater for the NFETs than the PFETs for any given TV,
with the % changes in the NFET Ron being the greatest at 1.08V. Lastly, another
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noteworthy observation from Figs. 89-90 is that there is significantly greater variation in
the % changes in Ron at 1.08V regardless of the operating temperature. This increased
variation at 1.08V is a major cause of the larger number of bit flips seen at this voltage.
Explanations and causes for these observations are provided later in this section.
All these aforementioned factors lead to disproportionate and unpredictable shifts
in VO with TV. Depending on the VOs being compared, if the Ron ratio in the

Fig. 88. Ratio of the sum of the Ron of the PFET transistors to sum of NFET transistors
vs. VO at 25C, 1.2V for Chip2
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Fig. 89. % change in combined Ron of the 2 PFETs versus VO for Chip2

denominator of the first term in (12) happens to be significantly different than that in the
denominator of the second term, the Ron % change terms in (12) play a weaker role in
determining the shift in VO with TV. However, if the Ron ratios are similar, then the
differences between the % change in combined Ron for the 2 PFETs and that of the 2
NFETs for a given VO will play a dominating role in dictating the shift in VO with TV.
These are the key reasons for the bit flips seen when comparing two different closelyspaced VO values at all 9 TV corners.
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It should be noted that, for any given path of the I-PUF primitive, the stacked
NFET and PFET transistors operate in the linear region while the PFET9p and NFET9n
transistors operate in the saturation region. All our transistors operate in the larger VGS
region so we generally see an increase in Ron with increasing temperatures for a fixed VDD
voltage. On the other hand, a decrease in Ron with increasing VDD voltages at a fixed
temperature is seen for the transistors in our primitive.
Due to these changes in Ron with TV, the VO voltage exhibits some interesting
behaviors as a function of changing TV. The I-PUF displays a self-compensating

Fig. 90. % change in combined Ron of the 2 NFETs versus VO for Chip2
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characteristic as a function of changing temperature. That is, as the temperature changes
for a fixed VDD, the Ron of each of the four transistors change in an unequal fashion,
however, the average ratio of the combined Ron of the 2 PFETs to that of the 2 NFETs
stays fairly constant rendering little to no change in the VO of the I-PUF with changing
temperature, as displayed in Figs. 91 and 92. On the other hand, as seen in Fig. 91, VO
does increase with increasing VDD but less than the expected VDD scaling factor of ~1.1X.
This stems from the fact that we see increasing ratios of combined resistance of the 2
PFETs to that of the 2 NFETs with increasing VDD, as depicted in Fig. 92. To be precise,
the combined Ron of the 2 PFETs decrease at a much smaller rate than that of the 2 NFETs
with increasing VDD, thus causing the increasing ratios seen in Fig. 92. Referring to (10),
it is clear that these increasing ratios mitigate the effect of an increasing VDD, thus
resulting in a lower than expected increase in VO.

Fig. 91. VO versus TV for Chip2
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Fig. 92. Ratio of combined path resistance of PFETs to NFETs versus TV for Chip2

Investigating the larger rate of decrease in the combined Ron of the 2 NFETs with
increasing VDD reveals that the NFET9n Ron plays a large role in this. The NFET9n Ron
decreases at a rate of approximately 1.7X that of the other transistors as a function of
increasing VDD, thus rendering the combined Ron of the 2 NFETs to decrease at a rate of
1.7X the combined Ron of the 2 PFETs. This is illustrated in Fig. 96 and is also reflected
in Table IX (a) which outlines the average TV noise of Ron in each of the four transistors
in our primitive. The reason that the NFET9n Ron shifts so much more with changing VDD
than the other transistors is due to the fact that unlike any of the other three transistors,
NFET9n experiences voltage changes on 3 of its terminals (G, S, D) with changing VDD.
This has a greater effect in modulating the Ron of NFET9n with changing VDD compared
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to the other three transistors. It is also noteworthy that although the NFET9n Ron changes
at a much larger rate as a function of VDD compared to the other 3 transistors, its
temperature dependency is in line with that of PFET9p. From Figs. 93 through 96, it is
observed that the change in the Ron of the stacked transistors with changing temperature is
larger than that of NFET9n and PFET9p. As explained in section 7.1, this is because the
stacked transistors are operating in the linear region and at a larger VGS and smaller VDS,
where the Ron changes with temperature are larger than at the saturation region (smaller
VGS and larger VDS). However, the difference in TV noise of NFET9n Ron from that of the
other transistors is mostly driven by its larger dependency on VDD. It should also be noted
from Figs. 93 through 96 that for the saturated transistors NFET9n and PFET9p, the
changes in Ron with temperature get smaller with decreasing VDD. The reason for this is
similar to what was seen and explained in Section 7.1 for the TG-PUF. A lower VDD
leads to a lower operating VGS for all the transistors and the saturated transistors operate
at a lower VGS than the linear transistors, and therefore closer to the VGS inflection point
below which the temperature dependency of IDS reverses (refer to the IDS vs. VGS curves of
PFET9p and NFET9n in Figs. A15 and A17 of Appendix A). The Ron and IDS changes
with temperature get smaller the closer the transistor gets to operating at their respective
inflection points. As can be seen from Fig. A15 and A17, the change in IDS with changing
temperature gets smaller with decreasing VGS. Decreasing VDD is what results in the
decreasing VGS in Figs. A15 and A17, and as VDD decreases, the VDS of PFET9p and
NFET9n is also not constant and is changing. Therefore, these changing behaviors of VDS
and IDS with temperature at different VDD are what cause the Ron dependency on
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temperature to change with VDD. As mentioned in Section 7.1, noteworthy is the fact that
the inflection point of where Ron’s dependency on temperature reverses will not match the
inflection point of where IDS’s dependency on temperature reverses. This is because the
VDS of the transistor also changes with changing VDD and is a central component in
determining the Ron. That is why when analyzing Fig. A17, it appears that the inflection
point of the NFET9n Ron should be somewhere slightly below a VDD of 1.08V, however
as is obvious from Fig. 96, it is somewhere well below a VDD of 1.08V after factoring in
changing VDS.
It is also evident from Fig. 91 and Figs. 93 - 96 that the Ron and VO variation gets
progressively worse with decreasing VDD, confirming the observation from Figs. 89 - 90.
Additionally, the measurement noise in Ron also gets worse with decreasing VDD and
temperature as observed from Fig. 97 but is negligible compared to the TV noise as
shown in Table IX (a). The Ron of the PFET9p and NFET9n transistors exhibit a higher
measurement noise value as shown in Fig. 97 but a quick look at Table IX (a) shows that
this is due to higher Ron values for these transistors and therefore the CV % of the
measurement noise in Ron is very similar for all four transistors. It is clear from Table IX
(a) that the combined Ron of the NFETs is more sensitive to TV variations than that of the
PFETs. This is because mobility variations with temperature cause NFETs to exhibit a lot
higher noise in Ron due to temperature variations than PFETs (see Fig. A10 in Appendix
A). Additionally, the NFET9n Ron is more sensitive to VDD variations than any of the
other transistors and thus, plays a bigger role in determining the TV sensitivity of the IPUF.
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From Table IX (a), it is indicative that the TV noise in the Ron of the stacked
PFET and PFET9p are very similar. This is explained by the fact that the noise in Ron due
to VDD variations is almost identical due to the fact that both the stacked PFET and
PFET9p have variation on 3 (S, D, B) of their terminals due to change in VDD. However,
as expected, the noise due to temperature variations is slightly larger for the linear region
operated stacked PFET than the saturation region operated PFET9p and this is what
causes the slightly larger overall TV noise of the stacked PFET. Similarly, the NFET9n
has a much larger noise in Ron due to VDD variations (G, D, S affected by VDD variation)
compared to the stacked NFET (G, D affected by VDD variation) however, the stacked
NFETs have a larger noise in Ron due to temperature variations due to the fact that they
operate in the linear region. The noise due to VDD is comparatively much larger in the
NFET9n transistor thus causing the higher overall TV noise in Ron of the NFET9n
transistor as compared to the stacked NFET transistor.
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Fig. 93. Ron versus TV for Chip2 stacked PFETs

Fig. 94. Ron versus TV for Chip2 PFET9p
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Fig. 95. Ron versus TV for Chip2 stacked NFETs

Fig. 96. Ron versus TV for Chip2 NFET9n
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Table IX. Average TV and measurement noise in (a) Ron of Chip2 (b) voltages of Chip2

Stacked PFET Ron

CV of TV Noise

TV noise

Measurement noise

(%)

(Ω)

(CV)

13.6

169

0.97 Ω
(0.08%)

PFET9p Ron

13.02

373

3.44 Ω
(0.12%)

NFET9n Ron

21.83

796

3.46 Ω
(0.09%)

Stacked NFET Ron

15.17

183

0.59 Ω
(0.05%)

Combined Ron of 2

12.8

528

-

20.00

976

-

PFETs
Combined Ron of 2
NFETs

(a)
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TV noise

Measurement noise

(CV)

(CV)

VO

36mV (15.6%)

0.47mV (0.07%)

VOD

6mV (16.6%*)

-

* normalized to VO TV noise

(b)

From Table IX (b), it can be seen that the measurement noise is negligible compared to
the TV noise. Just as in the TG-PUF, the difference operation of the voltages leads to a
lower magnitude of TV noise. A detailed explanation of what causes this and its
implications are provided in Section 7.1 and are directly applicable to the I-PUF
characteristics observed in Table IX (b). Making the assumption that the I-PUF operates
with TV noise levels similar to the NFET and PFET TG-PUF and considering the VO
voltages are around 620mV (about half-way between the NFET TG-PUF and PFET TGPUF TGV voltages), we would expect the TV noise in VOD to be within the range of
TGVD TV noise of the PFET TG-PUF (0.44mV) and the NFET TG-PUF (0.9mV).
However, the TV noise in VOD is 6mV indicating the much larger TV noise levels of the
I-PUF as compared to the TG-PUF. The TV noise in VOD is what dictates the sensitivity
of bit flips to TV variations in the unstable bitstring, as it is the differences of the VODs
that are used to generate the bitstring. This explains the higher intra-chip HD of the
unstable voltage-generated bitstrings of the I-PUF (6.18%) as compared to that of the TG169
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PUF (5.11%). This result was expected due to the incorporation of 2 PFETs and 2 NFETs
in the I-PUF primitive versus just 2 PFETs or 2 NFETs in each of the TG-PUF
primitives.

Fig. 97. Ron measurement noise versus TV for Chip2

An interesting observation emerges from the analyses of the TV noise in VO for
the I-PUF. From Fig. 98, it can be seen that the TV noise in VO increases with decreasing
VO. This occurs because a decrease in VO translates to a smaller combined Ron of PFETs
to NFETs ratio (see Figs. 91 and 92). This implies that the TV noise in the combined Ron
of NFETs, which is larger than that in the combined Ron of PFETs, plays a larger part in
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determining the overall TV noise in VO for decreasing VO. This leads to the observed
increase in the overall VO TV noise with decreasing VO. This indicates that we could
make our I-PUF more resilient to TV variations by increasing the combined Ron of PFETs
to NFETs ratio.

Fig. 98. VO TV noise versus VO for Chip2
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Simulation Results

All the PUF primitives were simulated using Cadence Virtuoso® Design Environment
version IC6.1.5.500 and Virtuoso® Analog Design Environment Spectre IC6.1.5.500.
This chapter presents the simulation results and compares and contrasts these results with
those obtained from hardware experimental data. All model files, cell libraries, etc. used
in the design of the chips were used in the simulation. It should be noted that in the rest of
this chapter, when stating VGS and IDS for PFETs, it is implied that it is actually being
referred to |VGS| and |IDS| for PFETs.

8.1 TG-PUF

The NFET and PFET primitives of the TG-PUF were simulated separately to better
observe the effects of varying temperature and voltage conditions on each primitive. Figs.
99 and 100 illustrate the schematic of the NFET and PFET primitives, respectively, used
in the simulation. These were also the same primitives used in the chip design. It should
be noted from Fig. 100 that the PFET primitive is actually constructed from 4 PFETs of
the same size. The top 2 PFETs, 1p1 and 1p2, are connected in parallel and their total
parallel resistance is denoted later in this section as 1p, while the bottom 2 PFETs, 9p1
and 9p2, are connected in parallel and their total parallel resistance is denoted later in this
section as 9p. It should be obvious from the schematics below that NFET1n
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is what is referred to as the stacked NFETs previously in this document while PFET1p is
the stacked PFETs. Similarly, what is referred to NFET9n and PFET9p here is referred to
NFET9 and PFET9 in section 7.1, respectively.

Fig. 99. Schematic of NFET TG-PUF primitive
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Fig. 100. Schematic of PFET TG-PUF primitive

Next, the VDD voltage is swept from 1.08V to 1.32V to yield the VDD corner
information at 1.08V, 1.2V, and 1.32V (1.2V +/- 10%). This VDD sweep is conducted in
conjunction with a parametric analysis sweep of the temperature at -40C, 25C, and 85C.
This yields the 9 corner TV simulation data. It should be noted that in the rest of this
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chapter, the -40C data is color coded as blue, the 25C data as green, and the 85C data as
red.
Fig. 101 depicts the TGV data at all 9 TV corners for the NFET TG-PUF
primitive. The x-axis represents the VDD voltage sweep while the 3 different temperatures
are color coded. It can be seen that the TGV voltage increases with increasing
temperature and increasing VDD.

Fig. 101. Simulation results for TGV vs. TV for the NFET TG-PUF
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From hardware experiments, it was also seen that TGV increased with increasing
VDD and temperature and a quick review of Section 7.1 confirms that. It should be noted
that the data plotted in Section 7.1 is for all 85 SMCs for a single chip. The spread in the
TGV data for a given TV corner exemplifies the spread across the SMCs. As can be seen,
the simulation results match the experimental results for all the 9 TV corners and fall
within the spread of the hardware results.
Fig. 102 depicts the simulation results for the PFET TG-PUF. Again, good
agreement between simulation and experimental results was seen when comparing to
Section 7.1.
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Fig. 102. Simulation results for TGV vs. TV for the PFET TG-PUF

Next, the relationship of IDS versus TV is simulated for the NFET and PFET TGPUF primitives. This is depicted in Figs. 103 and 104. It should be noted from Fig. 104
that two sets of curves have been shown for the PFETs. The bottom set of curves are the
IDS vs TV curves for each of the four individual PFETs in the PFET TG-PUF schematic
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whereas the top set of curves are the total IDS through the primitive (double of the bottom
set of curves). IDS increases with decreasing temperature and increasing VDD, and this
matches the experimental results from Section 7.1.

Fig. 103. Simulation results for IDS vs. TV for the NFET TG-PUF
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Fig. 104. Simulation results for IDS vs. TV for the PFET TG-PUF

A sweep of the VGS of NFET1n in the NFET TG-PUF primitive across all 3 temperatures
yields the IDS versus VGS relationship depicted in Fig. 105. It is clear from this graph that
as shown in Fig. 70 and described in [74], the IDS (and therefore the Ron) of the transistors
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exhibit a bimodal dependency on temperature. The inflection point where there is no
dependency on temperature is at around a VGS of 0.87V. Below this value, the IDS
increases with increasing temperature and above this value, IDS decreases with increasing
temperature. As stated in Chapter 7, our TG-PUF operates in the region where Ron
increases with increasing temperature.

Fig. 105. IDS vs. VGS for NFETs in TG-PUF
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Fig. 106 depicts the IDS vs. VGS relationship of the PFETs in the TG-PUF. Similar
behavior as the NFETs is seen from this figure except the facts that the changes in IDS
(and therefore Ron) are much smaller with changing temperature for the PFETs than they
are for the NFETs and that the changes in IDS (and therefore Ron) from -40C to 25C are
much larger than those from 25C to 85C. Again, we operate in the region where Ron
increases with increasing temperature and the inflection point for IDS’s reversal in
temperature dependency appears to be at 0.92V.

Fig. 106. IDS vs. VGS for PFETs in TG-PUF
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Next, we plot the simulation results of the DC operating points for IDS vs. VGS for
each of the transistors in the NFET primitive and the PFET primitive. Figs. 107 and 108
demonstrate this for the NFETs 1n and 9n for the NFET TG-PUF primitive, whereas
Figs. 109 and 110 demonstrate this for the PFETs 1p and 9p for the PFET TG-PUF
primitive, respectively. It can be seen from Figs. 107 and 108 that 1n exhibits larger shifts
in IDS with changing temperature compared to 9n and this is due to the larger VGS DC
operating points of 1n. 1n also operates farther away from the inflection point of 0.87V
while 9n operates a lot closer to it.
From Figs. 109 and 110, it is evident that the PFETs exhibit similar behavior as
the NFETs. 1p exhibits larger shifts in IDS with changing temperature compared to 9p,
and 1p also operates farther away from the inflection point of 0.92V compared to 9p.
Also noteworthy from Fig. 110 is that the IDS of PFET9p appears to reverse its
dependency on temperature around the 0.88V region, meaning that the PFET9p operating
conditions cause it to cross the inflection point where the IDS dependency on temperature
reverses. This is very similar to the PFET9p reversal that was seen in the experimental
results of Section 7.1 except that the inflection point is predicted a little lower than what
was observed (0.937V).
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Fig. 107. Simulation results of IDS vs. VGS by Temperature for NFET1n

Fig. 108. Simulation results of IDS vs. VGS by Temperature for NFET9n
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Fig. 109. Simulation results of IDS vs. VGS by Temperature for PFET1p

Fig. 110. Simulation results of IDS vs. VGS by Temperature for PFET9p
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As an example, Fig. 111 below recaps the experimental results obtained from
testing the NFET primitive on all SMCs of one of the chips. It can be seen that the
simulation results of the IDS vs VGS DC operating points for NFET9n match pretty well
with the experimental results in Fig. 111 when considering the spread of the experimental
data.

Fig. 111. Experimental results of IDS vs. VGS by Temperature for NFET9n

Next, the Ron of the transistors in the NFET and PFET primitive are simulated at
the 9 TV corners based on the DC operating points of the TG-PUF. Figs. 112 and 113
depict the behavior of the Ron of NFETs 1n and 9n as a function of changing TV.
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Fig. 112. Simulation results of Ron of NFET1n at 9 TV corners
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Fig. 113. Simulation results of Ron of NFET9n at 9 TV corners
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As expected from Figs. 112 and 113, the Ron of NFETs 1n and 9n decrease with
decreasing temperature and increasing VDD. Comparing these simulation results with the
experimental results of Section 7.1, we see that the Ron of NFET1n matches within 2% of
the value obtained by experiment, while the experimental results for the Ron of NFET9n
is about 15% higher than that obtained from simulation. It should be kept in mind that the
experimental result comparison is based on data from just one chip and due to the larger
Ron of NFET9n, the discrepancy appears fairly large. When compared to the data from
all chips, the simulated results are well within the distribution of the Ron obtained from
the hardware experiments.
Figs. 114 and 115 illustrate the behavior of the Ron of the PFETs in the PFET TGPUF primitive as a function of changing TV conditions.
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Fig. 114. Simulation results of Ron of PFET1p at 9 TV corners
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Fig. 115. Simulation results of Ron of PFET9p at 9 TV corners
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Comparing the PFET Ron simulation results of Figs. 114 and 115 to the
experimental results of Section 7.1, it is evident that the values are within 1% for the
PFET1p and within about 10% for the PFET9p which operates fairly close to the
inflection point.
Next, the regions of operation of each of the transistors in the NFET and PFET
primitives were investigated. Figs. 116 and 117 depict the regions of operation at all 9 TV
corners for the NFETs and PFETs respectively. The y-axis designates the regions whereas
the x-axis represents the 3 temperatures of -40C, 25C, and 85C. These temperature
sweeps are conducted at all 3 VDD settings of 1.08V, 1.2V, and 1.32V to give us the
information depicted below.
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Fig. 116. NFETs 1n and 9n regions of operation at the 9 TV corners
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Fig. 117. PFETs 1p and 9p regions of operation at the 9 TV corners

A region of operation of 1 corresponds to the linear region whereas 2 corresponds
to the saturation region. Evident from the region of operation graphs is that NFET9n stays
in saturation at all TV corners, however NFET 1n stays in the linear region at 25C and
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85C but flips to the saturation region at -40C. On the other hand, PFET1p stays in the
linear region at all TV corners and PFET9p stays in the saturation region for all TV
corners. These results are in complete agreement with what was obtained from
experimental results because the Ron of NFET9n and PFET9p are much higher than
NFET1n and PFET1p, respectively, and higher Ron is associated with transistors in
saturation. Furthermore, as corroborated from experimental results that agree with the
simulated results, the saturated transistors operate at a lower VGS and thus closer to the
inflection point where temperature changes have smaller impact to the Ron compared to
that of the transistors operating in the linear region.
The total power dissipation of the NFET and PFET TG-PUF primitive was
simulated at the 9 TV corners. These results are depicted in Figs. 118 and 119 for the
NFET and PFET primitives respectively. It is evident that the power dissipation increases
with decreasing temperature and increase VDD. Another noteworthy fact is that the NFET
primitive dissipates about 21% more power than the PFET primitive mainly due to the
higher currents in the NFET TG-PUF primitive. The simulated power dissipation results
agree fairly well with what was observed in the experimental results.
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Fig. 118. Total power dissipation of NFET TG-PUF primitive at the 9 TV corners
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Fig. 119. Total power dissipation of PFET TG-PUF primitive at the 9 TV corners

8.2 I-PUF

Fig. 120 illustrates the schematic of the I-PUF primitive used in the simulation. This was
also the same primitive used in the chip design. It should be noted from Fig. 120 that the
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PFET primitive is actually constructed from 4 PFETs of the same size. The top 2 PFETs,
1p1 and 1p2, are connected in parallel and their total parallel resistance is denoted later in
this section as 1p, while the bottom 2 PFETs, 9p1 and 9p2, are connected in parallel and
their total parallel resistance is denoted later in this section as 9p. It should be obvious
from the schematic below that NFET1n is what is referred to as the stacked NFETs
previously in this document while PFET1p is the stacked PFETs.

Fig. 120. Schematic of I-PUF primitive
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Next, the VDD voltage is swept from 1.08V to 1.32V to yield the VDD corner
information at 1.08V, 1.2V, and 1.32V (1.2V +/- 10%). This VDD sweep is conducted in
conjunction with a parametric analysis sweep of the temperature at -40C, 25C, and 85C.
This yields the 9 corner TV simulation data.
Fig. 121 depicts the VO data at all 9 TV corners. The x-axis represents the VDD
voltage sweep while the 3 different temperatures are color coded. It can be seen that the
VO voltage increases with increasing temperature and increasing VDD. Noteworthy is the
fact that the rate of increase in VO gets larger with increasing VDD, which was also
evident in the experimental results and is due to the slower rate of decrease in the
combined NFET Ron at higher VDD. The increase in VO with temperature was not seen at
these levels in the experimental results and this discrepancy is likely attributed to
temperature modeling gaps in the transistor standard cells. The VO values seem to be
predicted lower by simulation than what the experimental results yielded. This
discrepancy is due to the fact that the simulated results are being compared to the
experimental results of just one chip. When compared to the data from all chips, the
simulated results are well within the distribution of the VOs obtained from the hardware
experiments.
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Fig. 121. Simulation results of VO at the 9 TV corners for the I-PUF primitive

Next, the intermediate NFET and PFET voltages of Vy and Vw, respectively, are
obtained as a function of the 9 TV corners. This is simulated by conducting a DC sweep
of VDD between 1.08V and 1.32V at the 3 temperature points. The results are depicted in
Figs. 122 and 123. Noteworthy from these graphs is the fact that the intermediate NFET
voltage Vy exhibits a much larger shift with changing temperature than the intermediate
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PFET voltage Vw, and this is attributed to the fact that the Ron of the NFETs has a larger
change with temperature as compared to the Ron of PFETs. Also, while both voltages
increase with increasing VDD, Vy increases with increasing temperature whereas Vw
increases with decreasing temperature. This is consistent with the expected behavior as
the Vw voltage is calculated as a drop from VDD whereas Vy is calculated as an increase
from GND.

Fig. 122. Simulation results of Vy at the 9 TV corners for the I-PUF primitive
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Fig. 123. Simulation results of Vw at the 9 TV corners for the I-PUF primitive

Figs. 124 and 125 recap the Vy and Vw voltages obtained from the experimental
results. As can be seen when comparing the simulated results to those of the hardware
experiments, the Vy and Vw voltages exhibit the same characteristics at the 9 TV corners.
The Vy and Vw values, however, seem to be predicted a little lower than what the
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experimental results yielded. This discrepancy is due to the fact that the simulated results
are being compared to the experimental results of just one chip. When compared to the
data from all chips, the simulated results are well within the distribution of the VOs
obtained from the hardware experiments.

Fig. 124. Hardware experimental results of Vy at the 9 TV corners for the I-PUF primitive
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Fig. 125. Hardware experimental results of Vw at the 9 TV corners for the I-PUF primitive

Next, the Ron of the transistors in the I-PUF primitive is simulated at the 9 TV
corners based on the DC operating points of the I-PUF. Figs. 126 through 129 depict the
behavior of the Ron of NFET1n, NFET9n, PFET1p, and PFET9p as a function of
changing TV. Comparing these simulation results with the experimental results of
Section 7.3, we see an overall good match with the following exceptions. As stated
earlier, the VO was predicted a little lower by simulation than what the experimental
results yielded. This therefore had a greater impact on the simulated Ron results of
NFET9n and PFET9p as their values are directly dependent on VO, unlike the NFET1n
and PFET1p Ron values. Therefore, when comparing the simulated Ron values of NFET1n
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and PFET1p with the experimental results, we see an excellent match between simulation
and experimental results. However, when comparing the results of the Ron of NFET9n and
PFET9p, we see that the experimental results are about 30% higher than the simulated
results and this is mainly due to the fact that the VO values obtained by experiments are
higher than those obtained by simulation. Once again, it should be noted that this is based
on comparison with experiment results from just one chip. The Ron results obtained by
simulation are well within the distribution of the Ron obtained by experiments for all
chips. Noteworthy is the simulated behavior of the Ron of PFET9p. As can be seen from
Fig. 129, the Ron of PFET9p increases with decreasing temperature at 1.08V, with the Ron
at -40C and 25C almost identical. However, the -40C Ron curve crosses over with
increasing VDD and at 1.32V, is almost identical to the Ron at 85C. The reason for this
behavior is attributed to the fact that PFET9p, which operates in the saturation region,
also operates in a region which is fairly close to the cross-over inflection point where the
temperature dependence of the Ron of the transistor flips, i.e. the Ron increases with
increasing temperature above this inflection point but decreases with temperature below
it. Since 9p operates near this point, we see the cross-over behavior of the Ron curves as a
function of TV.
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Fig. 126. Simulation results of Ron of NFET1n at the 9 TV corners for the I-PUF
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Fig. 127. Simulation results of Ron of NFET9n at the 9 TV corners for the I-PUF
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Fig. 128. Simulation results of Ron of PFET1p at the 9 TV corners for the I-PUF
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Fig. 129. Simulation results of Ron of PFET9p at the 9 TV corners for the I-PUF

The regions of operation of the individual transistors in the I-PUF primitive are
illustrated in Fig. 130 at all TV corners. It should be noted that Fig. 130 represents the
regions of operation at all the VDD voltages while the x-axis represents the 3 temperature
settings, so it should be clear that the regions do not change as a function of TV. The
simulated regions of operation match those seen in the experimental results. The NFET9n
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and PFET9p operate in saturation region for all TVs while the NFET1n and PFET1p
operate in the linear regions. This is also consistent with the higher Ron values of these
saturated transistors.

Fig. 130. PFET1p, PFET9p, NFET1n, and NFET9n regions of operation at the 9 TV
corners
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Lastly, the total power dissipation of the I-PUF primitive as a function of the
different TV corners is depicted in Fig. 131. As can be seen, the power dissipation of the
I-PUF primitive is lower than that of either the NFET or PFET TG-PUF primitive. This is
mainly due to the stacked effect of the multiple transistors which has the effect of
increased source to body bias of the stacked transistors and subsequent increase in
threshold voltage, causing a drop in sub-threshold leakage current.

Fig. 131. Total power dissipation of I-PUF primitive at the 9 TV corners
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8.3 Comparative Area and Power Characteristics

Area and power consumption of a PUF design is of paramount importance in assessing
the viability of implementation of the design. This section presents some of the area and
power characteristics of our PUF designs and based on available literature, a comparison
of our designs to some of the competing PUF designs have been made as it pertains to
area and power.
For our TG-PUF and I-PUF designs, each SMC occupies an area of approx. 500
µm2, so the total area occupied by the array of 85 SMCs is approx. 42,500 µm2. If the
SMCs are placed adjacent to each other (instead of being distributed as in our design), the
array would occupy a 206 µm x 206 µm region. The VDC occupies an area of 136 µm x
60 µm. The area of the digital components, i.e., the LFSR and bit generation engine, is
estimated at 300 µm x 300 µm. On-chip memory requirements for the array of 680 NFET
and PFET TGs is approx. 2,380 bytes for our design. Therefore, a total area of approx.
140,660 µm2 per chip would be allocated to the PUF based on our current design and
assuming existing on-chip memory could be shared for PUF use. This results in an area
per unit base entropy of 500 µm2 / 16 voltages = 31 µm2 / unit base entropy (V) for the
TG-PUF and 62 µm2 / unit base entropy (V) for the I-PUF .
Based on available literature, the RO PUF at 130nm node exhibits 43 µm2 / unit
base entropy (frequency) [30]. The area characteristics of the other types of PUFs are
listed below in Table X [30][76][78][84].
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The total power consumption is calculated as the sum of the static power, dynamic
power, and short circuit power. The dynamic and static power consumption, which
consists of the charging/discharging of load capacitance and the sub-threshold leakage
current, is negligible compared to the short circuit power consumption in our PUF
primitives as we have a direct path from VDD to GND through 2 NFETs (or PFETs) in
series for the TG-PUF and 2 NFETs and 2 PFETs in series for the I-PUF. Therefore, the
short circuit power consumption is dominated by the DC power of approx. 210 µW at
25C, 1.2V per NFET primitive for the TG-PUF. Assuming an approx. 10 nsec on-time
per NFET primitive (100Mbps) results in an energy consumption of 210 µW * 1e-8s =
2.1 pJ per NFET primitive of the TG-PUF. The short circuit power consumption for the
PFET TG-PUF and the I-PUF are 196 µW and 164 µW respectively. This calculates to an
energy consumption of 1.96 pJ and 1.64 pJ for the PFET TG-PUF and the I-PUF
respectively.
For comparison, the Arbiter PUF and the Delay-Line PUF exhibit an energy
consumption of 0.239 pJ and 0.066 pJ, respectively while the RO PUF exhibits an energy
consumption of 244.2 pJ [30]. The IC Identification circuit PUF (ICID) [26][78] exhibits
a power consumption of 120 µW and at a throughput of 5 Mbps, calculates to an energy
consumption of 24 pJ per bit. This is for 130nm technology to generate an ID length of
256 bits. Table X summarizes the results for these different technologies.
The sub-threshold leakage power component of the static power consumption
of our PUFs are minimal due to the higher Vth and an inherent stacked transistor design of
our PUF primitive, the design of which is known to be very resilient to leakage current
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due to the increased source to body bias of the stacked transistors and subsequent increase
in threshold voltage [79][80]. Additionally, Adaptive Reverse Body Biasing (RBB)
techniques can be applied to further reduce the leakage component [81] of scaled devices
where the leakage component may be unacceptable. However, an estimate of the subthreshold leakage power and dynamic power of our NFET TG-PUF primitive is 6.5pW
and 4nW at 25C, 1.2V, respectively.
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Table X. Area, Power, and Energy characteristics of various PUF designs
[30][76][78][84][85].
PUF type

Area per unit base

Power/Energy

entropy

dissipation

TG-PUF

31 µm2

196µW/1.96pJ

90nm

I-PUF

62 µm2

164µW/1.64pJ

90nm

RO PUF

43 µm2, 62 µm2

244.2pJ

65nm, 130nm

1000 µm2

104 pJ

65nm

1089 µm2

0.239 pJ

130nm

3000 µm2

0.5 pJ

65nm

Delay-line PUF

Unavailable

0.066 pJ

65nm

SRAM PUF

0.81 µm2

100µW

65nm

2.5 µm2

0.09 pJ

65nm

DFF PUF

11.9 µm2

Unavailable

130nm

Buskeeper PUF

4.63 µm2

Unavailable

65nm

ICID

4.63 µm2

120µW/24pJ

130nm

Arbiter PUF
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Work

Both of the novel PUFs described in this work have demonstrated the production of high
quality bit strings that perform exceptionally well under stringent statistical metrics
including stability, randomness, and uniqueness on all 63 chips tested. The 63 chips with
85 SMCs designed on each chip allowed for a robust sample size that allowed for
statistically sound conclusions to be drawn.
The generated bitstrings were tested with industry-standard NIST tests to
validate that they were of cryptographic quality. The stability of these bitstrings was
evaluated using exhaustive controlled environmental testing at industry-standard 9 TV
corner ratings on all 63 chips. This work was unique in the fact that a full-blown 9 TV
corner testing was conducted on a sample size of this extent.
Significant was the fact that the TG-PUF bitstrings produced by voltage
comparisons and those by VDC digitized voltage comparisons were evaluated and
compared using identical quality standards. This allowed for evaluation of the pros and
cons of each method of generating the bitstring and more importantly, allowed the
evaluation of the penalties involved with the digitization process. Other related work in
the PUF research space usually evaluates only the digitized bitstrings, so this research
was unique in assessing both voltage-derived bitstrings and digitized bitstrings. It should
be noted that this was not possible for the I-PUF as the voltage range to be digitized was
much higher than it was for the TG-PUF (for reasons explained earlier) and the limited
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capacity of our VDC did not allow for stable I-PUF bitstrings to be generated. Therefore
for the I-PUF, only bitstrings generated by voltage comparisons were successfully
analyzed.
For the TG-PUF, the % of bits from the original voltage-derived bitstring that
were preserved as strong bits was 34.5% and dropped to 14.7% for the VDC-derived
bitstrings. This was an indication of the added noise induced by the VDC digitization
process. Furthermore, by disabling the threshold technique to get an idea of the
underlying noise levels and comparing the intra-chip HD of the voltage-derived bitstrings
with that of the VDC-derived bitstring, we saw an increase in its value from 5.11% to
8.68%. This was also an indication of the increased noise levels associated with the
digitization process in the TG-PUF. For the I-PUF, the % of bits from the original
voltage-derived bitstring that were preserved as strong bits was 22.18%, indicating that
the TV noise was higher in the I-PUF as compared to the TG-PUF. Another indication of
the higher TV noise levels in the I-PUF was revealed when comparing the intra-chip HD
of the TG-PUF voltage-derived bitstrings to that of the I-PUF voltage-derived bitstrings
when thresholding was disabled. An increase of the intra-chip HD from 5.11% (for the
TG-PUF) to 6.18% (for the I-PUF) was noted indicating the increased TV noise levels.
The increased TV noise levels in the I-PUF was explainable by a comparison of
the 0.9mV TV noise observed in the NFET TGVD distribution with the 6mV TV noise
observed in the VOD distribution. Analysis of the underlying TV noise associated with
the Ron of the combined PFET path and the combined NFET path comprising the I-PUF
primitive revealed that the Ron variation in each of these paths due to TV changes was
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much larger than the TG-PUF because of the much higher resistance values of each of
these paths in the I-PUF. This also resulted in the TV noise (as reflected in the CV% of
the noise) of the VO voltage in the I-PUF to be higher than the TV noise of the TGV
voltages of the NFET and PFET TG-PUFs.
The PFET TG-PUF exhibited the least TV noise as indicated by a 0.44mV TGVD
TV noise. The higher TGVD TV noise of the NFET TG-PUF compared to the PFET TGPUF was further understood by analyzing the TV noise levels associated with the Ron of
the NFET transistors as compared to the PFET transistors. The TV noise in the Ron of the
NFETs was significantly higher than that of the PFETs and this was driven mainly by
larger electron mobility shifts with varying temperature, as shown in Appendix A.
Novel techniques such as thresholding and TMR were demonstrated to improve
the inter-chip HD close to an ideal value of 50% and the intra-chip HD to an ideal value
of 0%. These achieved metrics are equal or better than those of the predominant
competing PUF designs based on literature referenced in this work [38, 69, 75, 76] and
Table I. These novel techniques were developed as an alternative to popular error
correction and helper data schemes which tend to suffer from additional area
overhead/cost and the increased chance of attacks and data compromise. The probability
of failure data was also presented and showed how the TMR technique can decrease the
probability of failure by several orders of magnitude for a given scaling factor, when used
in conjunction with the thresholding technique. Compression techniques such as run
length encoding were presented in an effort to reduce the size of the public helper data.
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All analyses related to the PUFs stability to TV variations were scrutinized down
to the physical parameter level to understand how those were impacting the bitstring
stability and causing the unpredictable bit flips. This work lacks precedence in shedding
light on evaluating the extent to which physical parameters affect the stability
characteristics of these novel PUFs. Analysis of the unstable bits revealed that they were
primarily being caused by non-linear and disproportional shifts in the voltages with
changing temperature and VDD conditions. Understanding the root cause of this was
imperative and led to the analyses of the Ron of the transistors with changing temperature
and VDD conditions, and this was found to be inducing the non-linear shifts in the
voltages. A mathematical model consisting of transistor Ron ratios at enrollment
conditions and % change of Ron from enrollment conditions was derived to better
understand the disproportional and unpredictable voltage shifts that were causing the bit
flips. Furthermore, it was seen that this non-linear behavior in Ron was also a function of
the VGS and VDS, and thereby the operating regions of the transistors making up the PUF
primitive. These characteristics were simulated and the results were compared and
contrasted with the experimental results to reveal a satisfactory match.
The PG-PUF voltage variation as a function of changing temperature and VDD
were also analyzed and shown to be linear, but no simulation or bitstring analysis of this
PUF was done as that was beyond the scope of this work. A study of two different voltage
comparison strategies to generate the bitstring was conducted and revealed vital
information related to undesirable voltage bias that proved crucial in selecting a
differential comparison approach to generating the final bitstring.
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Several strengths of the TG-PUF and I-PUF architectures were highlighted in this
work. The salient characteristics were that the architectures were entirely silicon-based
and used the existing power grid array of a chip to generate a unique ID that is also
digitized on-chip. Also, the architecture scales with process nodes as the primitive
consists of minimum-size transistors that are expected to exhibit larger variation with
technology scaling. Furthermore, our PUF has no complex ECC circuitry on-chip and
having this circuitry on-chip is generally a disadvantage of other PUF architectures as it
takes up valuable area and could render the architecture more prone to attacks.
Future work would entail designing a VDC with greater capacity or even looking
at different VDC architectures that may exhibit a lot less digitization noise than our
current design. As shown on the left side of Fig. 13, integrating the instrumentation used
to measure the voltages and to add an offset and control the Cal1 voltage, will be one of
the goals for the next version of the chip.
The offset calibration process is challenging and would require the possible
implementation of a state machine and temperature feedback circuit. The Cal1 offset
voltages can be derived using a resistor-ladder network [82], and added to the TG voltage
using a voltage subtractor/adder circuit [83]. The offset only needs to be accurate to
approx. 5 mV, which significantly reduces the area overhead of the ladder network. With
the availability of these on-chip components, a state machine can be designed to carry out
the calibration process.
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Also, a closer look at implementing effective compression techniques to reduce
the public helper data size would be beneficial as the thresholding and TMR techniques
render the public helper data size large.
A review of Table X reveals that the area and power characteristics of the TGPUF and I-PUF are fairly comparable to other PUF designs based on available literature.
However, as expected, there appears to be a large range in the area and power
characteristics of the different PUF designs based on the process technology node used. It
would be beneficial to implement our PUF designs on a more current process node and
evaluate the area and power characteristics or better yet, design some of the predominant
competing PUFs on the same chip and evaluate their performance side-by-side. This is
also another goal of the next chip design.
Lastly, aging studies of PUFs seems to be picking up in the research community
as this has a very practical implication on the PUF usage scenario and reliability.
Although our chips have been through numerous temperature and voltage cycles as part
of several studies related to the designs on the chips, there have been no controlled aging
studies done on our PUF designs. This would be something to explore in the future.
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Fig. A1. Illustration of sense wire bias showing up in the voltages of the TG-PUF

Fig. A2. Illustration of removal of sense wire bias by taking differences of TGV voltages
of the TG-PUF
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Fig. A3. Illustration of sense wire bias showing up in the voltages of the I-PUF

Fig. A4. Chip1 NFET TGV distribution at enrollment
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Fig. A5. Chip1 NFET TGV + OFFSET distribution at enrollment

Fig. A6. Chip1 PFET TGV distribution at enrollment
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Fig. A7. Chip1 PFET TGV + OFFSET distribution at enrollment

Fig. A8. Chip2 I-PUF VO distribution at enrollment
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Fig. A9. Chip2 I-PUF VO + OFFSET distribution at enrollment

Fig. A10: Example mobility vs. temperature curves for electron and holes [71] for
varying doping densities (1016 (top curve), 1017 and 1018 (bottom curve) cm-3)
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Fig. A11. TG-PUF Stacked NFET IDS vs. VGS at different temperatures

Fig. A12. TG-PUF PFET9 IDS vs. VGS at different temperatures
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Fig. A13. TG-PUF Stacked PFET IDS vs. VGS at different temperatures

Fig. A14. I-PUF Stacked PFET IDS vs. VGS at different temperatures
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Fig. A15. I-PUF PFET9p IDS vs. VGS at different temperatures

Fig. A16. I-PUF Stacked NFET IDS vs. VGS at different temperatures
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Fig. A17. I-PUF NFET9n IDS vs. VGS at different temperatures

Fig. A18. I-PUF combined PFET path Ron at the 9 TV corners
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Fig. A19. I-PUF combined NFET path Ron at the 9 TV corners

Fig. A20. Chip1 NFET TG-PUF TGVD TV noise vs. TGVD
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Fig. A21. Chip1 PFET TG-PUF TGVD TV noise vs. TGVD

Fig. A22. Unequal shifts in TGV with changing TV for Chip1 SMC53 NFET TG-PUF
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Fig. A23. Unequal shifts in VO with changing TV for Chip2 SMC0 I-PUF

Fig. A24. Magnified view of circled region in Fig. A22 showing unequal shifts in VO
with changing TV causing a bit flip
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Fig. A25. Large Ron changes from enrollment with VDS for stacked NFETs of TG-PUF at
25C, 1.08V

Fig. A26. Small Ron changes from enrollment with VDS for stacked NFETs of TG-PUF at
25C, 1.32V

233

Fig. A27. Ron changes from enrollment with VDS for NFET9 of TG-PUF at 25C, 1.08V

Fig. A28. Ron changes from enrollment with VDS for NFET9 of TG-PUF at 25C, 1.32V
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Fig. A29. Example IDS vs. VGS curves for NFET at different VDS
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